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Abstract
As economic sanctions have been increasingly used to advance a range of foreign policy goals, a great deal of research has explored the determinants of sanctions use and
sanctions success. Despite the fact that research on economic sanctions has produced
significant advancement in our understanding of the causes and efficacy of the usage
of these tools, a few important questions remain overlooked or unanswered in the
sanctions literature. This dissertation aims to look into some of these overlooked
questions by asking three interrelated questions. First, how do third-party rivals of
the possible target state affect the onset of economic coercion? To answer this question, I look at variations in the target state’s third-party rivals. Specifically, I develop
a theory of the process through which sanctions are initiated by the sender and then
responded to by the target taking the target’s third-party rivals into account. I find
that the sender is more likely to levy sanctions against a potential target country
when the potential target is involved in an ongoing international rivalry with third
states. Second, how do the target’s third-party rivals affect the sanctions outcomes?
I show that the target is more likely to resist when the target has active third-party
rivals by establishing an empirical link between conflictual interstate relationships
and sanctions outcomes. Finally, how do the target’s domestic institutional factors
affect sanctions outcomes conditional on the influence of the target’s trade policies on
sanctions outcomes? To answer this question, I examine the possible interactive relationship between the target state’s trade openness and its domestic institutions with
target acquiescence. Analyzing the target’s domestic environment in which the target
responds to sanctions, I show that the positive relationship between trade openness
and the likelihood of target acquiescence is less prevalent in democratic countries
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compared to authoritarian regimes. To test the hypotheses theoretically derived in
each chapter, I employ a variety of statistical tools and use several data sources,
including the Threats and Impositions of Economic Sanctions (TIES), Correlates of
War (COW) data-sets, the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project data-set, and the
Gravity database from CEPII, among others. I find support for my expectations in
statistical tests.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The leadership of President Donald Trump opens a boom time for U.S. sanctions. As
of this writing, the U.S. has 36 active sanctions programs1 in place, targeting at 30
different countries or territories.2 There is no surprise that the Biden administration
continues the U.S. foreign policy of using sanctions (i.e., by “using the blocking of
assets and trade restrictions to accomplish foreign policy and national security goals.”
(defined by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC))). Under Biden administration, within just two months of March and April
in 2021, 23 of the total 36 sanctions programs were updated, and some were newly
initiated to address several emerging political issues, such as cyber-related sanctions
1

As of May 01, 2021, the 36 sanctions programs administered by OFAC include:
Balkans Sanctions, Belarus Sanctions, Burma-Related Sanctions, Burundi Sanctions,
Central African Republic Sanctions, Chinese Military Companies Sanctions, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA), Counter
Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions, Counter Terrorism Sanctions, Cuba Sanctions,
Cyber-related Sanctions, Democratic Republic of the Congo-related Sanctions, Foreign Interference in a United States Election Sanctions, Global Magnitsky Sanctions,
Hong Kong-related Sanctions, Iran Sanctions, Iraq-related Sanctions, Lebanonrelated Sanctions, Libya Sanctions, Magnitsky Sanctions, Mali-related Sanctions,
Nicaragua-related sanctions, Non-proliferation Sanctions, North Korea Sanctions,
Rough Diamond Trade Controls, Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions, Somalia Sanctions, Sudan and Darfur Sanctions, South Sudan-related Sanctions, Syria
Sanctions, Syria-related Sanctions, Transnational Criminal Organizations, Ukraine/Russia-related Sanctions, Venezuela-related Sanctions, Yemen-related Sanctions,
and Zimbabwe Sanctions.

2

Include Afghanistan, Belarus, Burundi, Central African Republic, China (PR), Côte
d’Ivoire, Crimea Region, Cuba, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea,
Fiji, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Myanmar, North
Korea, Palestinian Territories, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Syria, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe (sourced from OFAC).
1

against North Korea on April 15 and sanctions on Chinese military companies on April
30. Sanctions have become an increasingly prominent part of U.S. foreign policy to
deal with major adversaries such as North Korea, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, and
to address the newly emerging issues (such as cyberattacks), promulgated by the
OFAC. In the past two years of 2019 and 2020, OFAC’s enforcement penalties hit
a record of more than $1.2 billion U.S. dollars on average yearly. It is at the right
time to reconsider the questions that have been overlooked in sanctions literature,
making practical policy implications and advancing our understanding of the causes
and efficacy of the usage of sanctions.
Though there is a large literature considering when economic sanctions are used
and succeed, the majority of existing studies approach these questions with a narrow
focus on the sender-target based characteristics3 while only a few examines the possible impact that the third parties that are not directly involved in sanctions episodes
have on the initiation and outcomes of sanctions.4 However, theories of how the target state’s third-party rivals affect sanctions use and sanctions outcomes are underdeveloped in both the sanctions initiation literature and the effectiveness literature.5
Additionally, the structural determinant of the trade-politics relationship (Peterson
and Wen 2021), i.e., domestic institutions, is overlooked in sanctions effectiveness
literature as scholars traditionally identify economic ties and political regime as the
major predictors of economic sanctions success separately while ignoring the possible
interaction effect of the target’s institutions and the target’s trade policies on target
3

For a detailed literature review on sanctions effectiveness, see Kobayashi (2017) and
Peksen (2019).

4

For the study of the impact of third-party allies on sanctions initiation, see Peksen
and Peterson (2016), for scholarly work on the third parties’ impact on sanctions
effectiveness, see Early (2009; 2011; 2012; 2015)’s works which research on the “Bustered Sanctions.”

5

The conceptualization of rivalry used in my dissertation is discussed in the following
section of the literature review.

2

acquiesce. Therefore, to fill these gaps in sanctions literature, in this dissertation, I
explore the following three interrelated questions: How do third-party rivals of the
(potential) target state affect the onset of economic coercion by the (possible) sender?
How do the target’s third-party rivals affect the sanctions outcomes? And how do
the target’s domestic institutional factors affect sanctions outcomes conditional on
the influence of the target’s trade policies on sanctions outcomes?
In sanctions literature, we have an incomplete understanding of how broader multilateral considerations among the complex interstate relationships would affect the
onset and outcome of sanctions. First, scholars find that third-party countries (excluding the sender and the target directly involved in sanctions episodes), especially
the target’s allies, affect the (possible) sanctioning state’s decision to levy sanctions
against a potential target country. However, scant research has considered the possible impact of the target’s third-party rivals on the sender’s decision-making regarding
the usage of economic coercion. As a possible answer to my first research question, I
argue that the sender is more likely to threaten or impose sanctions against a potential target when the potential target is involved in an ongoing interstate rivalry with
third states. The sender is more likely to use sanctions because the sender expects
the target to acquiesce quickly under external pressure. Additionally, the credible
aggression (associated with higher economic and military capabilities and aggression
history of these third-party rival states) by the target third-party rivals could also
speed up solving issues involved in the schemed sanctions in favor of the sender. I
contend that third-party rivals limit the targets’ capability to evade the intended
economic costs of the potential coercion as the targets are motivated to devote their
finite resources to prevent power shifts and attacks from their adversary with higher
political priority compared to resisting sanctions. As a consequence, senders are more
likely to use sanctions when the current international environment favors their bargaining positions during sanctions afterward. In my empirical tests, to account for the

3

impact of the target’s third-party rivals on sanctions onset, I measure the presence
of the target’s third-party rivals, the number of third-party rivals, their economic
capabilities, their military capabilities, the presence of major-power third-party rivals, the number of major-power third-party rivals, the alliance relationship between
the primary sender and the target’s third-party rivals, and the similarity of political
interests between the sender and these rivals. I find support for my expectations in
statistical tests using data on sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions
(TIES) project version 4.0 (Morgan et al. 2014) spanning 1950 to 2005. My findings
affirm the importance of the target’s third-party rivals in influencing the sender’s
strategic behavior of using economic coercion.
Second, it is more of the target state’s turn to respond once sanctions are either threatened or imposed by the sender. From the target’s point of view, how its
third-party rivals affect the target’s decision to acquiesce to the sender’s demands is
the question that is not previously explored. In an effort to fill this gap, the second
question of my interest is: how do the target’s third-party rivals affect the sanctions
outcomes? As a proposed answer to this question, I argue that the target of sanctions
looks to its risk of being attacked by its third-party rivals when it decides whether to
make concessions in current sanctions episodes to the sender. When the target has
active third-party rivals excluding the primary sender, the target is less likely to acquiesce in current sanctions episodes because acquiescence signals the target’s weakness.
In contrast, resistance signals its capability and resolve and could prevent potential
attacks from its rivals. Conversely, when the target maintains peaceful relationships
with third states, the target will be more likely to acquiesce in current sanctions
episodes mainly due to economic motivations. I argue that target states have incentives to misrepresent their true resolve and capabilities when they are involved in an
ongoing international rivalry with third states. Target resistance following sanctions
is an ideal means to signal intense resolve to those third-party rivals that are not

4

directly involved in current sanctions episodes and to distract attention from domestic problems, if any, by using the sender as a scapegoat. Additionally, the target’s
third-party rivals also bring a sender commitment problem that sanctions withdrawal
is less credible and sanctions recurrence is likely given the findings in answering my
first research question. The empirical analysis of Threat and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data spanning 1950-2005 lends support to my expectation that target
states with active third-party rival(s) are less likely to acquiesce following sanctions
episodes.
Third, there is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions targeting
authoritarian regimes are less effective than those against democratic regimes. However, this line of research assumes that autocratic regimes unconditionally resist more
intensely against foreign pressure compared to democracies. To identify the conditions under which similar regimes might act differently towards economic coercion by
examining a possible interactive effect between trade openness and domestic institutions, the third question of my research interest is: how is the divergent impact of
target’s domestic institutions on sanctions outcomes conditional on the target state’s
trade policies? I assert that institutional structure, conditional on trade openness,
motivates and restricts target leaders’ decision to defy foreign pressure. Sanctions are
more likely to succeed when they disproportionately harm the ruling coalition and the
public in authoritarian regimes which adopt open-trade policies. Sanctions are less
likely to succeed when institutions blur responsibility and ameliorate social cleavages
introduced by trade interruptions in democratic countries, although trade openness is
high in these countries. It follows that sender states need greater awareness of the target’s overall economic structure and the domestic institutional structure if they want
to induce concessions from the target effectively. I find support for my arguments in
statistical tests spanning 1962-2005.

5

Taking the impact of the target’s third-party rivals into account, when do states
initiate sanctions? Why are sanctions frequently employed as a common foreign
policy tool while remaining a low success rate? Why do similar regimes respond to
economic sanctions divergently conditional on the target country’s different levels of
trade openness? I answer these questions in three empirical chapters. Figure 1.1
illustrates the triadic relationship among the sender, the target, and the target’s
third-party rivals before and during sanctions episodes analyzed in chapters two and
three.6 The presence of such rivalries forces the (possible) target state to utilize
its finite resources to defend the potential attacks from its rivalries with political
priority because the target plans its foreign policy around its counterparts as past
negative interactions lead the target to expect such violent interactions to continue
or repeat in the foreseeable future. Therefore, to the (potential) sender, the target’s
interstate rivalry with third states signals the target’s possibility of being attacked
and the target’s inability to mobilize all her resources to evade the economic costs of
(potential) sanctions, and thus invites sanctions. However, the sender might not be
able to achieve her political goals as she expected by using sanctions when the target
is involved in an interstate rivalry. This is because the target state has incentives
to misrepresent her capabilities and resolve under sanctions as sanctions could also
invite attacks (Lektzian and Sprecher 2007; Peterson and Drury 2011). Just as crisis
bargaining theorists argue that war can be prevented if the parties recognize the
true balance of motivation, scholars of war termination suggest that wars end once
the combatants learn each other’s levels of resolve (Goemans 2000; Ramsay 2008;
6

In my dissertation, I focus on “severe rivalry” conceptualized by Klein et al. (2006;
2008)–severe rivalries are those in which the states see one another as enemies and
competitors (Colaresi et al. 2008). As a result, unresolved salient issues often drive
such sentiments, which encourage rivals to handle their contested issues via frequent
and intense uses of violence (Diehl et al. 2019).

6

Kertzer 2017). Therefore, the target state is more likely to resist sanctions when
involved in an interstate rivalry with third states.
Chapters two and three build upon the literature on signaling (Morrow 1999;
Gartzke et al. 2001; Weeks 2008) and resolve (Kertzer 2017; Kertzer et al. 2019) and
scholarly work on leverage and vulnerability (Peksen and Peterson 2016; Peterson
2020). My theory links the rivalry literature to the literature on sanctions, highlighting the importance of the current international environment as an indicator of the
sender’s and the target’s strategic behavior regarding sanctions. Sanctions literature
identifies three major mechanisms that explain the success of sanctions (especially
sanctions threats), i.e., the coercive, the informational, and the public commitment
hypothesis (Walentek et al. 2021). However, no attempt has yet been made to apply
this framework to explain sanctions outcomes considering interstate rivalry, which
is a problem that is particularly relevant to the current international environment
in which the target state needs to survive with the optimal political priority. My
dissertation fills this gap. One additional contribution made by my dissertation is
that, in chapter four, building upon the findings of the impact of institutions and
micro-foundations on sanctions success (Lektzian and Patterson 2015; Peksen 2019;
Jeong and Peksen 2019), I examine the interactive impact of domestic institutions
and trade openness on the probability of target acquiescence. The remainder of this
introductory chapter motivates the project, discusses methodological approaches used
in pursuit of the research questions, and provides an organizational outline for the
dissertation.
1.1
1.1.1

Sanctions and Interstate Rivalry: An Unprobed link
Economic Sanctions as Foreign Policy

Since the 1970s, economic sanctions (as a major policy tool, at least, of the United
States) have played an increasingly prominent role in international politics. According to the OFAC’s definition, sanctions are “using the blocking of assets and trade

7

restrictions to accomplish foreign policy and national security goals.“ Technically, economic sanctions are economic measures, such as financial or trade restrictions levied
by a constitutionally authorized international body in order to alter another nation’s
policies in some pre-specified manner, and policy changes must be met before economic relations can resume (Barber 1979; Doxey 1987; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan
et al. 2009; 2014).
Three common parts of the two definitions are noteworthy. First, in this dissertation, only state-to-state sanctions are discussed.7 Any state-to-state sanctions
involve at least one sanctioning state and a sanctioned state. The former state is
conventionally referred to as a “sender” and the latter state as a “target”.8 Intuitively, not all states use sanctions; in fact, only a few countries frequently employ
sanctions. According to TIES, the US accounts for almost half of all sanctions cases
between 1945 and 2005. In the past few years, China has also been increasingly using
sanctions. Second, sanctions (though commonly mentioned as economic sanctions)
take a variety of restriction formats, including economic embargo, trade restriction,
blockade, financial restriction (e.g., asset freeze and termination of foreign aid), travel
ban, and suspension of economic agreement or protocol.9 Expulsion and recall of ambassador, temporary closing of embassies, and ending diplomatic contact are counted
as diplomatic sanctions rather than (economic) sanctions. Third, sanctions discussed
in this dissertation must be accompanied by demands by the sender with the effort
7

Restrictions imposed by non-state actors such as a boycott by consumers (for example, the Chinese consumers’ boycott of H&M products following Xinjiang cotton
boycott in March 2021) or divestment efforts by subnational entities (for example,
Foxconn’s divestments from China since 2019) are not considered sanctions

8

In TIES, the primary sender can be international organizations. Additionally, sanctions involving multilateral efforts are not rare. However, I exclude multilateral
sanctions and sanctions initiated by international organizations to isolate the target’s third-party rivals in chapters 2 and 3.

9

Many sanctions programs include multiple sanctions types.

8

to persuade the target to change one or more of its policies. The issues involved in
sanctions range from salient realpolitik issues (such as containing political influence
or military behavior, destabilizing regime, releasing citizens, property, or material,
solving a territorial dispute, denying strategic materials, retaliating for alliance or
alignment choice, improving human rights, ending weapons/materials proliferation,
terminating support of non-state actors, and deterring or punishing drug trafficking
practices) to environmental and purely economic issues (such as improving environmental policies, implementing economic reforms, and altering trade practices). That
says sanctions for the purpose of trade protectionism are not considered sanctions.
States are employing economic sanctions with greater frequency in pursuit of a variety of foreign policy objectives in the past 20-40 years, partially because the costs
of modern war are too high (Bueno de Mesquita 1983) and the economic interdependence increases in the era of globalization (Farrell and Newman 2019). Since then,
economic sanctions receive great attention from political scientists and policy-makers
alike. According to TIES (Morgan et al. 2014) records, there were 1412 sanctions
initiated between 1945 and 2005. The number of sanctions use has been grown significantly since the 1990s. In parallel with the growing policy debate and public
attention to economic statecraft, sanctions scholarship has accomplished considerable progress in providing insight into two major strands of sanctions literature, i.e.,
sanctions onset and sanctions outcomes.10 Among the immense literature on sanctions, the two major questions that have been motivating sanctions scholarship are
10

While precise definitions of economic sanctions differ across sources, this dissertation adopts those used by Baldwin (1985) in his foundational book on this subject,
Economic Statecraft. By his definition, sanctions are defined by their means, effects,
and motivations. Sanctions refer to any action that involves the restriction of economic ties between the sender and the target in order to create economic distress
in the target state for the purpose of extracting political concessions.

9

(1) when and why countries employ economic sanctions and (2) whether economic
sanctions work.11
On the one hand, research on the first question of sanctions onset demonstrates
that the usage of sanctions reflects trade-politics relationships between states (Lektzian and Souva 2003; Crescenzi 2003; Cox and Drury 2006; Goenner 2007; HafnerBurton and Montgomery 2008; Drury et al. 2014; Peksen and Peterson 2016). On the
other hand, the usage of these tools serves domestic political purposes (Kaempfer and
Lowenberg 1992; Drury 2001; Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010; Whang 2011). The two
dominant perspectives, i.e., the strategic usage of sanctions and the use of these tools
for domestic politics, have provided starkly different answers to the question of why
states use sanctions. Before discussing the literature on the determinants of sanctions
effectiveness or success involved in the second question, it is important to note that
the question of what counts as “effective” (or “successful”) has been a contentious
issue. With a high threshold of sanctions success, sanctions are counted successful
with target total acquiescence in response to external pressure (Pape 1997). Others suggest that sanctions could still be considered effective in the absence of total
capitulation by target countries. With a lower threshold of sanctions effectiveness,
sanctions are effective when the target makes full or partial compliance (Elliott 1998;
Hufbauer et al. 2007; Morgan et al. 2014).12 This body of scholarship on the second
question of whether sanctions work concludes that the major predictors of sanctions
11

Since the 1990s, with the introduction of large-N datasets, scholars have turned into
more systematic examinations of other previously unexplored questions, such as why
some sanctions last longer than others (Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Dorussen and
Mo 2001; Krustev and Morgan 2011), what the economic effects of sanctions on the
target are (Biglaiser and Lektzian 2011; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013; Peksen and
Son 2015), and when and how sanctions work with the emphasis on smart/targeted
sanctions (Cortright and Lopez 2002; Elliott 2002; Shagabutdinova and Berejikian
2007).
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In this dissertation, I favor the first interpretation of sanctions effectiveness (i.e.,
target total acquiescence) in operationalizing sanctions outcomes contingent upon
my theories.
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success are: issue at stake, type of political regime in the targeted country, the level of
income equality, alliance status, trade dependence, military capability, international
cooperation, expectations of future conflict, sanctions type, among other factors.13
In these two major bodies of sanctions literature, the possible impact of the target’s third-party rivals on both sanctions onset and sanctions outcomes is overlooked.
Additionally, theories of how domestic institutions affect the trade-politics (or tradesanctions) relationship are underdeveloped.
1.1.2

Conceptualization of Third-party Rivalry

A focus on rivalry is warranted in the study of international relations if states act
strategically to sanctions due to the conflict-prone nature of interstate rivals. In
my dissertation, the conceptualization of interstate rivalry includes three dimensions:
temporal dependence, spatial consistency, and militarization.14 First, the key point
concerning the temporal component of interstate rivalry is that past events affect
the present behaviors of states engaged in rivalry (Klein et al. 2006; Colaresi et al.
2008) and rivals operate in the assumption that contention will continue into the
future, i.e., “enduring rivalries” (Goertz and Diehl 1993). This feature makes the
security threats posed by rivals salient and potential attacks predictable. Therefore,
the presence of enduring rivalries is informative. Second, the spatial consistency
allows me to operationalize interstate rivalry as a dyadic phenomenon and exclude
the primary sender from the target’s rivals, given my special research interest in
third-party rivals (Diehl and Goertz 2000). Some states may become non-militarized
commercial rivals (Hensel 1999; Levy 1999). For example, the US rivalry with Japan
in the 1970s and 1980s is an example of a commercial rivalry in which there was
little expectation that competition would lead to militarized hostilities (Hensel 1999;
Rapkin 1999). The US-China rivalry, especially under Trump’s administration, begins
13

For a more thorough literature review of sanctions effectiveness, see Peksen (2019).

14

See Dreyer (2014)’s works on detailed conceptualizations of interstate rivalry.
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as a commercial rivalry that does not likely develop into a militarized rivalry given its
unbearable costs to both countries though possible (Navarro 2006; 2011). However,
given that trade-oriented sanctions and sanctions involving highly salient issues (such
as regime change) are significantly different (Hufbauer et al. 2007; Ang and Peksen
2007) and my security-oriented theory, the characteristic of militarization is included
in my conceptualization of third-party rivals. Additionally, militarization infers the
use of force in history, making future attacks from the rivals credible. Regarding the
measurement of “rivalry,” in my dissertation, I use the concept-measurement of “peace
scale,” which is developed to classify state-state relationships. The relationships are
those between governments of two states in which there are significant and ongoing
interactions. The “severe rivalry” and “lesser rivalry” categories capture rivalries
that have the unresolved salient issues that encourage rivals to handle their contested
issues via frequent and intense uses of violence (e.g., India-Pakistan 1947-present)
and rivalries that experience isolated violent episodes, diplomatic hostility, and nonviolent crises (e.g., Colombia-Venezuela during 1900-1982). In my dissertation, I
focus on “severe rivalry” because the signaling effect of severe rivals should be more
potent than that of less severe rivals. However, as part of the robustness check, I
also examine the signaling effect of rivalry with a broader definition in my empirical
analysis, which embraces both “severe rivalry” and “lesser rivalry.”
1.1.3

Discrepancy between sanctions use and sanctions efficacy

Figure 1.2 shows how these coercive efforts have become a common foreign policy
tool that states have employed with increasing frequency since the 1990s and the
corresponding sanctions outcomes. There were 1024 sanctions initiated between 1945
and 2005 on the TIES record.15 With a high threshold of sanctions success, sanctions
episodes appear to work 26% of the time. Applying a lower threshold when counting
15

The final outcome variable is not coded in TIES either because either those cases
are still ongoing or the data are missing. I exclude 388 cases with missing final
outcome records from 1412 total cases in TIES.
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both target’s partial and total acquiescence as effective sanctions, sanctions episodes
work 37.5% of the time. Although the United States has been conventionally viewed
to have at least some means of coercion against any other state (given that the United
States is the hegemon–or at least the most powerful state–during this period) and in
fact has been involved in more than half of sanctions episodes, U.S. sanctions success
rate does not seem high at all. According to the results presented in Figure 1.3, with
the high threshold of being successful, U.S. sanctions appear to work 25.8% of the
time (i.e., 139 successful cases among 538 cases). According to the latter view, U.S.
sanctions are successful tools about 37.5% (i.e., 202 successful cases among 538 cases).
Predominantly drawing on a small number of prominent cases such as the U.S.
sanctions imposed on Cuba after Castro came to power (Galtung 1967; Doxey 1972;
Baer 1973), they encouraged the conventional wisdom that sanctions rarely succeed.
With the increasingly prominent role of sanctions in modern international politics
following the introduction of a large-N dataset on sanctions (Hufbauer et al. 2007;
Morgan et al. 2014), this conventional wisdom was increasingly challenged. Scholars
argue that sanctions could be an effective tool of foreign policy, at least under certain
conditions. The major contribution of my dissertation project is to examine the
possible overlooked conditions under which the target state needs to survive with the
optimal political priority.
Figure 1.4 shows the distribution of successful sanctions cases and failed cases
categorized by the rivalry environment in which the target exists using TIES and the
rivalry dataset(Klein et al. 2008). According to the figure on the left side, during
the period of the analysis 1945-2005, there were 71.21% (which is the sum of the
purple and orange areas) of sanctions used against a target with active third-party
rivals. On the other hand, only 28.79% (which is the sum of the portions in green
and blue) of sanctions were initiated against a target that has no third-party rivals.
That says sanctions are more frequently used against targets involved in an interstate
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rivalry with third parties than states that maintain peaceful relationships with others.
According to the pie plot at the top right-hand corner of Figure 1.4, among those
sanctions levied on target with third-party rivals, 20.58% sanctions induce complete
target acquiescence while the senders fail to reach their goals in full in 79.42% cases.
From the bottom right-hand pie plot, 33.04% cases end up with the target’s total
acquiescence for those sanctions used against a target with no third-party rivals while
66.96% sanctions fail to coerce the target to make complete concessions.16
In chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this dissertation, I am primarily interested in understanding the puzzle of why sanctions are frequently used but seldom succeed by
looking into the third-party rivals’ impact on sanctions onset and sanctions effectiveness, respectively. From the sender’s perspective, the sender is more likely to sanction
states with more or stronger rivals because the sender anticipates that the potential
target likely acquiesces, given that the potential target is nonetheless more vulnerable to attacks from its rivals (especially when these rivals are capable and credible to
attack the target, and share some similar political interests with the sender). From
the target’s perspective, backing down signals weakness to rivals and invites future
sanctions or attacks, and therefore the target with more or stronger rivals is less
likely to acquiesce. This possible visualized discrepancy of third-party rivals’ impact
on sanctions initiation and sanctions efficacy motivates this project. This dissertation
mainly examines the possible third-party rivals’ impact on sanctions initiation and
sanctions effectiveness and reasons from the sender’s and the target’s perspective,
respectively. This dissertation contributes to our understanding of the asymmetry
between the frequent use of sanctions and the low success rate of coercive efforts.
16

To demonstrate the distribution of sanction onset and sanctions success grouped by
third-party rivals, I only look at unilateral sanctions with no institutions’ support
and exclude the sanctions cases involving solely economic and environmental issues
using the more strict interpretation of sanctions success in accordance with my
theories.
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Additionally, to answer the third question in my dissertation, I highlight that trade
and institutions can influence a wide range of political interactions, which have not
to be considered together in sanction literature.
1.2

Methodology

I empirically test the hypotheses presented in this dissertation using time-series crosssectional data structured dyadically (with a sender-to-target-year data structure in
specific) in chapter two. In chapters three and four, the unit of analysis is the case
(defined by TIES). The choice of different units of analysis across chapters is contingent upon my theories in each chapter. Although the U.S. use of sanctions motivates
this dissertation, the theories and statistical tests expanded to non-US senders with
the tests period spanning 1950-2012 (1950-2005 using TIES for chapters 2-4, and
1995-2012 using newly coded sanctions cases from ICEWS for chapter 2). In the
supplementary appendix file, I add additional models to demonstrate the robustness of my results employing multiple statistical techniques, including the generalized
random-effects models (for chapters 3 and 4), strategic selection models (for chapters
2 and 3), Heckman selection models (for chapters 3 and 4), and generalized linear
models (such as ordinal logistic regression for chapters 3 and 4). I employ a variety
of data sources, including but not limited to the Threats and Impositions of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, Correlates of War (COW) datasets, the Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) project dataset, and the Gravity database from CEPII, among
others.17
1.3

Outline of the Dissertation

The organization of this dissertation proceeds as follows. In the second chapter, I
develop a theory explaining how the tensions between the potential target state and
its third-party rivals might affect the onset of sanctions. Sanctions should become
17

The thorough discussion of the unit of analysis problem created by using strategic
selection models and Heckman selection models can be found in the appendix.
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more likely, all else equal, when the (possible) sender is more confident of achieving
its political goals, especially to persuade the (potential) target to change one or
more of its policies. If so, are senders more likely to initiate sanctions against the
target country when the target is involved in an ongoing international rivalry with
third states? Does the target’s third-party rivals’ credibility of attacking the target
increase the sender’s likelihood of using sanctions? Does the sender’s probability
of using sanctions increase as the target’s third-party rivals’ national capabilities
increase? Chapter three examines the possible impact of the target’s third-party
rivals on the target’s strategic response to sanctions episodes. Specifically, I ask
the following questions: How likely does the target state choose to resist sanctions
as a means of signaling resolve to its rivals? Does the presence of the target’s active
third-party rivals affect the target’s decision to resist sanctions? Do the target’s thirdparty rivals’ attacking credibility and military capabilities affect sanctions outcomes?
Is the target state more likely to resist sanctions when the sender and the target’s
third-party rivals share similar political interests? Chapter 4 continues to explore
the determinants of sanctions success, analyzing the target’s domestic environment
in which the target responds to sanctions. How do institutional factors affect target
acquiescence conditional on the influence of trade openness of the target country?
How does trade openness affect the probability of target acquiescence in different
regimes characterized by divergent domestic institutions? Lastly, drawing on the
answers I provide to these questions in my empirical chapters, the conclusion chapter
discusses the policy implications of this dissertation.
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Figure 1.1: A Triadic Relationship among the Sender, the Target, and the Target’s
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Figure 1.2: The Frequency of sanctions Onset and Effectiveness (All)
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Figure 1.3: The Frequency of sanctions Onset and Effectiveness (U.S.)
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Figure 1.4: Distribution of Sanctions Onset and Effectiveness (focusing on unilateral
sanctions episodes involving non-economic and non-environmental issues for targets
that have third-party rivals and targets that have no third-party rivals separately)
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Chapter 2
Sanctions and Rivals: How Third-Party Rivals Affect the Onset of
Economic Coercion
As economic sanctions have become increasingly popular foreign policy tools, a great
deal of research has explored determinants of sanctions onset (Drury 2001; Lektzian
and Souva 2003; Cox and Drury 2006; Drury et al. 2014). With an emphasis on the
actors directly involved in sanctions episodes, this line of research has focused almost
exclusively on the degree to which economic and political relations between sender
states and target states and the domestic politics of both sides affect sanction onset.
Another branch of literature on sanctions has explored the ability of third parties
to thwart sanctions success via “sanctions-busting” (Early 2009; 2011; McLean and
Whang 2010), with the focus on the possible trade redirection and economic support
offered by the target’s third-party allies, highlighting the effect of the target’s thirdparty allies on sanction onset (Peksen and Peterson 2016). Nevertheless, this branch of
studies universally focuses on the impact of the target’s third-party allies, which hold
the potentials to bust economic coercion efforts. Our understanding of the impact
of the third parties on sanctions onset remains incomplete. The prospective factors
that might favor sanctions efforts are overlooked. Hence, little is known whether the
target’s tensions with its third-party rivals affect the strategic interaction between
the sender and the target state prior to the initiation of sanctions.
In this chapter, I develop a theory explaining how the possibility and credibility
of a third-party’s potential attack on the target might affect sanctions onset. I argue that the (possible) sender is more likely to initiate economic coercion against a
potential target who has active third-party rivals. I examine both the presence (and
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the count of number) of the target’s third-party rivals, the national capabilities of the
target’s active third-party rivals, as well as the credibility of these rivals’ attacking
the target as indicators of the target’s vulnerability prior to possible sanctions. The
target’s vulnerability should motivate the possible sender to initiate economic coercion against the potential target state to reach its political goals because the current
international environment favors the sender’s bargaining position if the sender were
to use sanctions. When the target’s rivals hold greater national capabilities or more
credibility to use military forces, the sender will infer that economic coercion is more
likely to induce behavioral change in the target because the target is nonetheless
more vulnerable to attacks from its third-party rivals. From the sender’s perspective, the potential target is expected to be more likely to acquiesce so as to integrate
and mobilize all its resources to confront its third-party rivals, especially when these
rivals make their possible aggression and future attacks more credible with greater
national capabilities and propensity. Given that vulnerability invites sanctions (Peterson 2020; Akoto et al. 2020), one might assume that the possible senders also face a
free-riding problem. However, it is not necessary for all interested senders to maintain
consistency in the demands made of the potential target (Bapat and Morgan 2009).
Therefore, it is a matter of the timing of when to sanction rather than a matter of
choice about whether to sanction for the possible senders. Accordingly, initiating economic coercion during the window period of the potential target’s vulnerability, the
sender would expect sanctions to succeed in extracting concessions from the target
and simultaneously signaling that there are deadly consequences associated with defiance (i.e., future attacks from other rivals, if applicable). The realist paradigm also
supports senders’ sanctions onset during the target vulnerability even if the senders
also have rivalries with these states, suggesting that states ally against common enemies and thus states sharing common enemies should not fight each other (Farber
and Gowa 1997; Mearsheimer 1995).
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While there are possibly a number of factors that might affect the likelihood of
third-party rivals taking aggressive actions towards the target state, I operationalize
this concept of credibility (of taking aggressive actions towards the target) by incorporating the national capabilities of these rivals, the geographical distance between
the target and its rivals, as well as these rivals, use of military forces in history. I contend that this indicator is extremely useful in the sense that it captures a prospective
calculation of the third-party rivals’ likelihood to take aggressive actions (i.e., violent
or nonviolent, or both) on the potential target, especially from a sender’s perspective
prior to its use of sanctions. Consequently, pre-assessment of the potential target’s
vulnerability helps the sender anticipate its input and output of the possible use of
economic sanctions. Hence, the possible target’s third-party rivals might influence
the sender’s decision to use economic sanctions. I expect that the possible sender
is more likely to levy sanctions against the potential target state when the target
has more or stronger third-party rivals. In statistical models using data on the initiation of sanctions spanning 1950-2005, I find evidence supporting my theoretical
expectations.
Overall, this study extends our understanding of the third-party influence on the
use of sanctions (Early 2009; McLean and Whang 2010; Early 2012; Peksen and
Peterson 2016). Additionally, a growing number of studies examine sanctions as a
function of domestic politics (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Drury 2001; EscribaFolch and Wright 2010; Whang 2011). Although these factors undoubtedly affect
sanction policy, my study complements this extant scholarship by reasserting the role
of international politics–specifically, future conflict expectations between states and
the corresponding strategic behavior used to exercise influence.

22

2.1

Overlooked Third-Party Rivals’ Influence: An Incomplete
Explanation for Sanctions Use

The sender implements sanctions in order to change the behavior of the target state
(Barber 1979). The majority of sanctions onset literature focuses on the interaction between the sender and the target state to explain when sanctions are more
likely to be adopted. Under this setting of sanctions use, sanctions are initiated to
achieve a wide spectrum of policy goals and to address various policy issues, such
as releasing a political prisoner, improving human rights, terminating the target’s
support of non-state actors, ending nuclear proliferation, solving territorial disputes,
and retaliating for alignment choices, among other issues. In addition to the purpose of altering another state’s policies, economic sanctions are used as a signal to
anticipating future conflict. In this sense, senders that anticipate frequent conflicts
will be more willing to initiate economic coercion, even if such attempts are costly
(Drezner 1998). Overall, this strand of the literature demonstrates that the relative
economic capabilities and the extent of economic interdependence, as well as conflict
expectations between a pair of states, affect the probability of sanctions use (Drezner
1998; Cox and Drury 2006; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008; Drury et al. 2014).
Similarly, Peterson (2020) argues that economic leverage is associated with the initiation of sanctions threats (Also see in Akoto et al. (2020)). Studies also show that
democratic regimes more frequently initiate sanctions against nondemocratic regimes
than against their democratic counterparts as democratic peace factors, including
institutional constraints, shared values, and quick resolutions, also constraint the use
of economic sanctions (Cox and Drury 2006; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2008;
Drury et al. 2014). Others find that states with friendly relations and mutual alliance
commitments are less likely to use sanctions against one another (Drezner 1999; Drury
2001). This is because states do not anticipate frequent conflicts in the future. Whang
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(2010) contents that issue salience is positively associated with the decision to impose
sanctions.
Another strand of the literature of sanctions onset examines the significance of
political and economic considerations from the perspective of the senders, which use
sanctions to serve their domestic (and international) symbolic purposes (Lindsay 1986;
Giumelli 2011). At the domestic level, states are more likely to use sanctions when
news media draw public attention to human rights violations because leaders have to
take actions against abusive regimes under increasing public pressure (Peksen et al.
2014). Drury (2001) finds that approval ratings of leaders and the level of unemployment affect the probability of sanction initiation. Sanctions can also be used for
domestic symbolic purposes, and evidence shows that the U.S. presidents are likely
to use economic sanctions to display strong leadership in foreign policy in order to
boost their approval ratings (Whang 2011). Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1992) provide
empirical evidence that domestic interest groups motivated by economic considerations affect both the onset and the type of sanctions that will be employed against
target states.
More recent works shed some light on the role of third parties, specifically thirdparty alliances of the potential target state, in functioning sanction onset. Within
this branch of literature, one of the most common implications of previous work is
that targets are less vulnerable to economic coercion when they maintain economic
options beyond the sender (Crescenzi 2003; Bapat and Morgan 2009; McLean and
Whang 2010). Indeed, this intuition that target’s link with third-party allies (of
trade alternatives) affects the sender’s decision to initiate sanction episodes is common
to formal theoretic explanations of sanction use (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004;
Krustev 2010). Peksen and Peterson (2016) conduct the first comprehensive empirical
research on the impact that third-party states have on the initiation of sanctions,
finding that the sender is more likely to threaten or use (i.e., regardless of whether that
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episode began with a threat or imposition and regardless of whether sanction sever
were imposed) sanctions against its trade partners when the economic capabilities of
the potential targets’ allies are low. However, economically stronger allies demoralize
the sender’s consideration of using sanctions as these sanctions are not likely to make
the pain to the target.
Building from the studies of third parties discussed above, I contend that the decision of whether to levy sanctions against a potential target country is also influenced
by the sender’s assessment of the target’s current vulnerability to its third-party rivals in the current international environment. My argument introduces the important
role that rivals could play around the foreign-policy-making process, analyzing how
interstate rivalry status might condition sanctions use. My study is the first comprehensive empirical research on the possible impact of third-party rivals on sanction
onset.
2.2

Theoretical Framework

Peterson and Drury (2011) provide empirical evidence that imposed sanctions both
weaken and stigmatize the target, inviting attacks by signaling the potential target’s
weakness to the target’s rivals. Following a similar logic, the presence of the target’s
third-party rival(s) and higher target’s rivals’ military capabilities and the credibility
of using military forces also signal higher target’s vulnerability to possible sanctions
by signaling some credible security threats to the potential target, inviting sanctions.
For third-party rivals, leaders recognizing their comparative advantage in military
power will be more likely to see the military as a means of achieving state objectives (Peterson and Wen 2021). As military power grows, leader incentives expand
beyond survival and prosperity towards international influence (Holsti 1970; Thies
2009). Therefore, higher rivals’ military capabilities make attacks to the target more
possible. Additionally, states with balanced relationships between role conception and
role enactment will show congruent relationships between these traits (Walker 1987).
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At this point, the role theory argument also suggests a higher willingness to use forces
when states have higher military capabilities under a possible transition to the military power role. Therefore, the higher military capabilities of the third-party rivals
could signal the sender that the target is more likely to be attacked. For the target,
providing positive inducements (for instance, material incentives) to its supporters
from the adverse economic effects of sanctions and using repression to quell dissent
following sanctions are the two possible strategies for the target regime to shield its
supporters while weakening the opponents (Peksen 2019). This, in turn, helps the
target leaders maintain cooperation from their support base (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno
de Mesquita et al. 2003) and avert the erosion of their authority (Wood 2008; Peksen
2009; Peksen and Drury 2010). However, compared with domestic instability caused
by potential sanctions, states view interstate rivalry as their top political priority. For
example, the alliance between the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was formed to resist the Japanese invasion during
the Second Sino-Japanese War, which suspended the Chinese Civil War from 1937 to
1941. Evidence also shows that host states receiving US foreign aid that are involved
in an ongoing interstate rivalry will use the aid to arm against their rival, rather than
to undertake counterterrorism (Boutton 2014). Therefore, target third-party rivals’
presence, higher military capabilities of these rivals, and higher credibility of these
rivals’ using of military forces would increase the target’s vulnerability to potential
sanctions because the presence of interstate rivals constraints the target regime’s capability to use extra resources to provide positive inducements to its support coalition.
With strong rivals, the target has to utilize its finite resources to prevent major power
shifts and defend against potential attacks with the highest political priority. And
thereby, the sender is more likely to levy sanctions on the potential target country at
the target’s highest vulnerability to induce the target’s political leadership to com-
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ply with the sender’s demands when the target’s third-party rivals are credible and
capable of taking potential aggressive actions towards the target.
Consistent with the theoretical literature on sanctions, my model of economic
coercion begins with the premises that (1) the sender must have some leverage to
threaten and (2) the sender is more willing to use economic sanctions when it is optimistic about sanctions outcomes.1 If the target faces possible and credible security
threats posed by its third-party rivals and is in the most vulnerable position prior to
schemed sanctions, the sender would expect reasonably favorable sanctions outcomes
(for instance, to observe a higher likelihood of the target being attacked by its thirdparty rivals (Peterson and Drury 2011) if the sender’s purpose is to destabilize the
regime of the target) regardless of whether the target acquiesces to a demand backed
by a sanction episode. In this case, by serving as a trigger to start the third-party
rivals’ attack on the possible target, it could let the sender reap the benefits from the
direct conflict between the target and its third-party rivals while bearing the minimal
costs. On the one hand, when the potential target maintains substantial economic
relations with the possible sender, threatening or imposing economic restrictions at
the target’s highest vulnerability could significantly limit the wartime resources that
the possible target needs to mobilize in order to deter its rivals. For instance, the
potential sender’s denial of the target’s access to all or a particular set of strategic
materials during a military confrontation between the potential target and the target’s third-party rivals might be unbearable and lethal for the target. On the other
hand, using sanctions when the target is involved in an ongoing interstate rivalry will
limit the target’s capability to compensate its domestic supporters and the capability
of using repression to quell dissent given its finite material and military resources.
1

A growing number of studies examine sanctions as a function of domestic politics
(Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1992; Drury 2001; Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010; Whang
2011). Therefore, from the sender’s perspective, leaders view optimistic about sanctions outcomes as long as sanctions work in the way they schemed.
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Indeed, this scenario would be considered an ideal window period for the sender’s use
of sanctions because the sender would expect (1) that the target’s enormous costs
of dealing with many enemies at once would lead to a higher likelihood of inducing
compliance (Hufbauer et al. 2007) or (2) that the target’s lethal suffering would actually favor the potential sender’s primary purpose to initiate sanctions (for instance,
to destabilize the target’s regime) even if the sender does not expect the target to
acquiesce.
In addition, from the possible sender’s perspective, the potential target’s thirdparty rival(s) presence and these rival(s) national and economic capabilities increase
the possibility of an anticipated formation of a potential sanctions coalition against
the target. Drezner (1998) argues that senders are most likely to impose sanctions
when they expect future conflict. Also, these third-party rivals that share a common
enemy (of the potential target) tend to ally with each other (Maoz 2007). Therefore,
the target’s active rivals are likely to use or follow sanctions against the potential
target as they expect future conflict with the target state if they have not done so,
and a formation of multilateral sanction by sanctions coalition is anticipated. Strategically, the potential primary sender could expect to join the anticipated sanctions
coalition consisting of the potential target’s third-party rivals by simply threatening
or imposing sanctions during the target’s highest vulnerability, at no (or low) costs
of cooperation (Drezner 2000; Bapat and Morgan 2009; Early and Spice 2015).2 The
story that I am telling here infers (1) that the existence of target third-party rivals
informs that the rivals are likely to side with the sender if hostilities arise (when the
sender initiates sanctions) and (2) that interstate rivalry makes the target state an
2

There are costs of joining in pre-established sanctions coalition when a sender is to
expend the effort to build a coalition to support its efforts (Hufbauer et al. 2007).
For instance, the public goods argument posits that coalition partners attempt to
free-ride on one another and continue their economic exchanges with the target. The
coalition partners might also need to make concessions within the coalition to keep
consistency with the coalition’s demands.
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easy target. Therefore, a higher likelihood of the sender’s using sanctions is expected
when target third-party rivals exist.
Conversely, I contend that the potential sender will be less likely to levy sanctions
when it perceives that the possible target does not have any active third-party rivals or
these rivals (if any) fail to pose any credible threats of aggressive actions due to their
lack of capabilities to attack the potential target or a lack of military use history. This
expectation follows because (1) that the possible target is more capable of mobilizing
all its resources to resist the possible sender’s use of sanctions by utilizing all its
resources to compensate its support coalition and to repress dissent and easily find
market alternatives when the target remains a friendly relation with the rest of the
world and (2) worse still, the sender might also harm itself by hurting the confidence
of its foreign investment while initiating sanctions against target states which have
no misbehaviors recognized by the international community (as the potential target
has no active third-party rivals).
The discussion above makes it clear that the sender’s decision to initiate sanctions
depends on its expectations of the target’s likely response (Krustev 2010). Strategically, the sender will be more likely to use sanctions if the sender anticipates that the
target has to maintain its trade ties with the potential sender in order to better obtain
and mobilize its resources to respond to its third-party rivals’ provocation, subversion,
deterrence, or aggression. Accordingly, my main argument is that the credibility of
possible aggressive actions taken by the target’s active rivals is an important factor,
among many others, that might affect the possible sender’s expectations of sanctions
outcomes (i.e., the target’s likely response to sanctions) and thus affects the possible
sender’s decision to use sanctions.
In addition to examining the possible impact of the presence and count of the
target third-party rivals on the possible sender’s decision to initiate sanctions, I focus
specifically on the overall national capabilities of the target’s third-party rivals and the
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credibility of using military forces as important factors that might affect the potential
sender’s decision making in terms of sanctions use. Rivals coalition forms during
international rivalry, Arab-Israeli wars for example.3 Also, the primary reason to use
the total national capabilities of the target’s third-party rivals to approximate the
target’s vulnerability during sanctions episodes is that this indicator is prospective.
I argue that the national capabilities of the target’s active rivals serve as a useful
proxy for the target’s vulnerability before sanctions episodes. It is because greater
national capabilities of one or more rival states suggest a higher possibility that the
rival states as a whole could be more capable of taking aggressive actions towards the
target state and thus suggest more target vulnerability to schemed sanctions.
The presence of the target’s third-party rivals, the third-party rivals’ national
capabilities, and the credibility of using military forces by these rivals help us better
understand the target’s likely response to possible economic coercions prospectively.
The sender should also be assessing the target’s vulnerability prior to its sanctions
use, in addition to assessing the potential target’s capability to redirect lost trade
and to receive economic assistance from its third parties (especially its allies), and
use this knowledge to anticipate the sanctions outcomes and then decide whether to
use sanctions accordingly. This discussion leads to my following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1. The possible sender’s probability of using sanctions against the potential
target is higher when the potential target has third-party rivals.
3

States may also engage in triadic or multistate rivalry, for example, US-China-Soviet
triadic relations during the Cold War and competition between the member states of
NATO versus the member states of the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War (Diehl and
Goertz 2000). However, it extremely complicates my reasoning of the third-party
rivals’ effects on sanction onset if taking these multistate rivalries cases into account. In this dissertation, I only focus on unilateral sanctions without international
institutions’ support. The rivalry is defined in dyadic terms in this dissertation.
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Hypothesis 2. The possible sender’s probability of using sanctions against the potential
target is higher when the rivals’ credibility and capability of attacking
the target increase.
Hypothesis 3. The probability that the possible sender uses sanctions against the potential target is higher when the sender has similar political interests
with these rivals.
2.3

Data and Model Specifications

To test my hypotheses, I use data on all dyad-years to code my dependent variable,
i.e., sender’s initiation of sanctions, considering threatened and imposed sanctions
separately.4 To examine the onset of sanctions episodes, I merge the case-level data
on sanctions from the TIES project version 4.0 (Morgan et al. 2012) by dyad-year
(i.e., primary sender, target state, and start-year) with undirected dyad-year data,
including all possible dyad-years between 1960 and 2005. After the merging, there
are some years in which the sender threatens or imposes multiple sanctions against
the same target. To retain the dyad-year as my unit of analysis, I create dichotomous
variables that indicate whether the sender used sanction against a given country in a
given year.5 I remove sanctions cases in which the primary sender is an international
institution, given that the actors in my theory are states.
4

I choose dyad-year as my unit of analysis because my theory explains a strategic use
of sanctions considering the target’s vulnerability with or without the presence of
active third-party rivals. The unit of analysis of dyad-year allows me to model the
sender’s and the target’s characteristics as well as their interactions simultaneously
in a single equation.

5

By creating these dichotomous indicators, I aggregate the case data to code the onset
of at least one sanction in that dyad-year. Results look consistent if I include all
sanctions, although this coding decision leads to replication of some dyad-years in
my models, which technically alters the unit of analysis in a potentially problematic
manner and could bias results.
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Using the TIES to identify sanctions onset, I code four variants of this dependent
variable as shown in Table 2.1.6
The dependent variable of imposition is a binary indicator equal to one for the
start-year of a sanction episode during which the sender imposed sanctions. The
episode variable ignores whether that episode began with a threat or imposition and
ignores whether sanctions ever were imposed; that is, episodes that end in the threat
stage are also included. The threat variable accounts for the use of sanctions threat
only regardless of whether the threats were ever imposed afterward. All these six
variables are binary indicators equal to 1 when imposition, episode, or threat is observed in a given year and equal to 0 otherwise. I examine these different variants
of my dependent variable in such a holistic way in order to account for the formal
theoretic explanations of sanctions use (Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Krustev
2010). I code dependent variables for initiation of sanctions over any issue and the
use of sanctions over an issue other than trade, the environment, and economic reform separately. It is because trade disputes are less severe and potentially distinct
from security issues (Drezner 2003). The exclusion of these three issues also allows
me to determine whether support for my hypotheses extends beyond less important,
“low politics” issues (Drezner 2003). Given the use of six dichotomous dependent
variables, I estimate logistic models to test my hypotheses. I make one further correction in my statistical models. To address possible duration dependence, all sender
initiation models include a counter of years since sanctions imposition, episode, or
threat, respectively, along with a squared and cubed term thereof (Carter and Signorino 2010). The appendix presents a variety of additional models examining sender
6

To examine more recent sanctions onset, I code more recent sanctions using events
data from the International Conflict Early Warning System (ICEWS) enlightened
by Peterson (2021). ICEWS uses a proprietary algorithm to scrape media stories (Boschee et al. 2015). I use the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations
(CAMEO) indicators to identify sanctions onset at a dyad-year level. See in Appendix for more details.
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initiation using the newly-coded bilateral sanction data from ICEWS spanning 1995
to 2012. The results are robust.
2.3.1

Coding Explanatory Variables

I code nine variants of my primary explanatory variable of third-party rivalry capturing the target’s vulnerability associated with third-party rival(s)’ possibility and
credibility to take aggressive actions towards the target.7 In the main dissertation
document, the first explanatory variable is the presence of the potential target’s active
rival(s) excluding the primary sender state–operationalized as a dichotomous variable
equal to one when the state maintains a peace scale below 0.25 with at least one other
state (Klein et al. 2008), otherwise zero.8 My second explanatory variable is rivals’
attacking credibility. To code this variable, I adopt Weeks (2008)’s measurement of
audience cost. The variable RECIP in the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data
set takes value one if the target state responded with a militarized action, and zero
if the target state made no militarized response to the challenger’s threat or use of
force (Schultz 1999; 2001). On average, one should expect that initiators with a high
ability to generate audience costs should be less likely to face resistance than states
with a low ability to generate audience costs. Therefore, I aggregate the RECIP variable by the initiator, then divide the sum of RECIP by the sum of MID initiations.
The higher this reciprocation rate is, the less capable of generating audience costs,
and thus less attacking credibility. In my model, the “Rivalry x (1-Reciprocation
7

These variables include the presence of the target’s third-party rivals, the count
of third-party rivals, the sum of third-party rivals’ national capabilities, the sum
of third-party rivals’ GDP, the alliance relationship between the primary sender
and third-party rivals, the third-party major-power rival presence, the credibility of
attacking by the third-party rivals, and the political interests similarity between the
sender and the third-party rivals. A more detailed description of how I code these
variables and the results from the models using these different explanatory variables
can be found in the Appendix.

8

The peace scale has values 0.0 – serious rivalry, .25 – lesser rivalry, .50 – negative
peace, .75 – warm peace, and 1.0 – security community. These categories and the
coding criteria are described in detail in (Goertz et al. 2016).
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rate)” variable measures the target’s third-party rivals’ (if any) attacking credibility
by using the average Reciprocation rate of these rivals. The third variant calculates
the sum of the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) score (Singer et al.
1972) of the potential target’s third-party rivals. This score incorporates information
on population, urban population, military expenditure, military personnel, coal and
steel production, and energy consumption. One might argue that I could only add
these values if two rivals would join forces against the target state. If, however, the
two states (the rivals to the target) are enemies, then it might not be proper to assume they will join forces. My response is that it is not necessary for the rivals to join
forces. Instead, the sum of the CINC score measures the target’s rivals’ share of the
system’s capabilities. At a minimum, it forces the target to consider its capability to
defend its rivals holistically. Additionally, in the Appendix, I also measure the relative
capability of rivals to the target state instead of using the target’s absolute capability
as the relative capability measures the rivals’ leverage against the target. The results
remain consistent. The last variant of the primary explanatory variable presented in
the main dissertation document captures the ties between the sender and the target’s
third-party rivals. The Rivalry x Sender-rivals average UN voting similarity variable
measures the average political interest similarity between the sender and the target’s
third-party rivals (if any). Using the United Nations (UN) voting data set (Gartzke
1998; Strezhnev and Voeten 2013), I also calculate the maximum and minimum of the
UN voting similarity between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals, respectively (presented in the appendix), to capture the political ties between the sender
and the rivals.
2.3.2

Additional Control Variables

The confounding variables that I include in my models capture the sender’s leverage
that could motivate the use of sanctions and the target’s propensity for inviting
coercion, the omission of which could lead to spurious findings.
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First of all, I control for the presence of the target’s third-party ally. The sender’s
leverage on the target state in sanctions diminishes, and therefore the sender is less
likely to use sanctions when the target’s allies’ economic capabilities are high (Peksen
and Peterson 2016). The third-party allies’ presence captures the possibility that
its allies defend the target during sanctions. The COW formal alliance data (Gibler
2009) is used to capture third-party commitments to defend the target and to code
the third-party ally presence variable.
Next, my model controls for both the sender’s trade dependence and the target’s
trade dependence on each other. The sender’s trade dependence variable is calculated
by dividing the sender’s total trade (exports and imports) with the target by the
sender’s GDP. It measures the strength of the sender’s leverage to use sanctions.
The target’s trade dependence variable is coded as the sum of the target’s imports
from and exports to the sender, divided by the target’s total imports and exports.
It assesses the extent of a target state’s reliance on trade with the sender. Target
countries economically dependent on the sender might be more inclined to give in
to the external pressure (Drury 1998; McLean and Whang 2010) and thereby invite
coercion. I use the Correlates of War (COW) trade data version 4.0 (Barbieri and
Keshk 2012; Barbieri et al. 2009) and Gleditsch (2002)’s GDP data taken from the
Expended GDP dataset version 6.0 beta to code these two variables.9 Higher levels
of target trade dependence are indicative of the target’s lower ability to find alternate
trading partners while under sanctions. Therefore, higher levels of trade dependence
on the sender are expected to facilitate sanctions use.
Coercive economic measures are less likely to elicit concessions against wealthier
and powerful states. And thus, the target’s economy and national capability may
have an impact on the sender state’s decision to initiate sanctions. Specifically, I
9

In my alternative models using the ICEWS data to code sanction onset, I use the
GDP data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2011) given the wider time period that
GEPII covers for GDP data.
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include a variable for the (potential) target’s GDP, which I code as a proportion of
the (possible) sender’s GDP, using the GDP data from CEPII (Mayer and Zignago
2011). Wealthier states are more difficult to coerce and, all else equal, are likely to
depend on the sender for a lower proportion of their total trade. Similarly, I include
the CINC ratio measuring the relative capability of the target to the sender.
Moreover, I include a measure of the sender’s and the target’s twenty-one-point
polity score to capture the sender’s and the target’s level of democracy (Marshall and
Jaggers 2010). Studies show that democracies more frequently resort to sanctions
against nondemocratic states than their democratic counterparts, and therefore fewer
sanctions onsets are expected when states maintain relatively close ties and share
common norms (Cox and Drury 2006). In this sense, regime similarity increases the
probability of cooperation and thus reduces their need to use coercion against one
another. To account for this expectation, I adopt the polity ratio between the sender
and the target state.
Furthermore, I include a variable for the target state’s United Nations (UN) voting similarity with the primary sender (Gartzke 1998; Strezhnev and Voeten 2013).
This variable accounts for the fact that states holding similar interests and policy
preferences with the sender are unlikely ever to be targeted with economic coercion
initiated by the sender. The ongoing sanctions variable indicates whether the target
is under any active sanctions. Finally, I include a dichotomous variable indicating the
United States as the sender state, which stands out with respect to high leverage and
frequently uses sanctions. The summary statistics are presented in the appendix.
2.4

Analysis

The results of my statistical analysis show strong support for my hypotheses. Specifically, I find evidence that the target’s interstate rivalry with third states influences the
likelihood that the possible sender initiates or imposes sanctions.Table 2.2 presents
four undirected dyad-year logit models examining imposed sanctions onset (models 1
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to 4). Results from these four models provide support for my hypothesis 1-3. Considering coefficients, I find that state involved in third-party rivalry is positive and
significant (p < 0.01) in model 1. As such, the target’s active third-party rivals, if
any, appear to increase the probability that a state imposes sanctions against the
target. The coefficient for the rivalry x 1-reciprocation rate variable is positive and
significant in model 2. It means that the higher credibility of the target’s third-party
rivals’ use of military forces against the target is associated with a higher likelihood
that a state imposes sanctions against the target state. The coefficient for the thirdparty rival CINC variable is positive and significant in model 3. It indicates that
the target’s third-party rivals’ higher capability increases the probability of sanctions
imposition by the sender. The coefficient for the rivalry x sender-rivals average UN
voting similarity variable is positive and significant in model 4. It is interpreted
that the sender is more likely to impose sanctions against the target as the political interests similarity between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals gets
closer. To better visualize the predicted probabilities associated with these explanatory variables, I turn to Figure 2.1 which presents eight related plots that illustrate
the substantive magnitude of my predictions for sanctions use from models 1-4.
In Figure 2.1, the upper-left two plots illustrate the predicted probabilities of
sanctions imposition over any issues for two situations: no third-party rival presence
of the target (on the left), and third-party rival presence of the target (on the right),
respectively, as well as their 95% prediction intervals. Plots are made for the nonU.S. senders and the U.S. sender separately. The upper-right two plots illustrate the
predicted probabilities of sanctions imposition as the target’s third-party’s capabilities
increase for the non-U.S. senders and the U.S. sender separately. The lower-left two
plots of Figure 2.1 illustrates the predicted probabilities of sanctions imposition as the
target’s third-party’s credibility of attacks increase and their 95% prediction intervals.
Similarly, the lower-right-side plots of Figure 2.1 illustrate the substantive magnitude
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of sanctions imposition onset probabilities from models 4, for the non-U.S. senders
and the U.S. sender separately.
Table 2.3 presents coefficients and 95% confidence bounds for four models examining sanctions episode initiation (models 5-8). In Model 1, the primary explanatory
variable is the sum of the target’s third-party rivals’ CINC. I find preliminary evidence
that higher third-party rival(s)’ national capabilities suggest a higher likelihood that a
state uses sanctions. Similarly, the coefficients for variables measuring credibility and
political interests similarity between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals are
positive and significant. I also use visualizations to provide a complete explanation
of probabilities and marginal effects associated with the third-party rival(s)’ national
capabilities, credibility, and the similarity of their political interests with the sender.
Specifically, Figure 2.2 illustrates the effects of these variables as estimated in Models
1-4 in Table 2.3. These findings provide support for my hypotheses regarding the
onset of sanctions episodes. Results of the statistical models demonstrate support
for my expectations that the potential target’s third-party rivals’ presence, national
capabilities, attacking credibility, and the political interests similarity with the sender
are positively associated with the sender’s likelihood of using sanctions.
The differences between third-party rival presence and third-party rival absence
are further illustrated in Table 2.4, in which I examine changes in the predicted probabilities of sanctions use. The presented predicted probability changes are calculated
using Model 1 from Table 2.2 corresponding to Figure 2.1 and Model 5 from Table
2.3 corresponding to Figure 2.2. In the first two columns, I hold all continuous independent variables at their medians.10 The first two columns calculate sanctions use
probability for non-U.S. senders. I find that third-party rival(s) presence is associated with approximately a 90.43% increase in the probability of imposing sanctions
10

The third-ally presence variable takes value zero. The sender polity score takes 7.
The target polity score is -7.
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in an otherwise median dyad and a 72.11% increase in the probability of initiating
non-economic sanctions.11 The percentage change in the likelihood of conflict resulting from having third-party rival(s) does not change too much for U.S. dyads, while
the change of probabilities of using sanctions changes quite a lot compared to non-US
dyads. Given that the U.S. accounts for more than half of sanctions episodes recorded
in TIES, it makes sense. Specifically, the presence of third-party rival(s) of the target
is associated with approximately an 89.94%, 71.54% increase in the probability of
using sanctions (i.e., sanctions imposition and sanctions onset) by the United States.
2.5

Conclusion

Sanctions onset has received ample scholarly attention. This line of research has
focused almost exclusively on sender-target relations and the domestic politics of
each state, with the emphasis on strategic calculations by the sender prior to its
sanctions use. However, no attempt has yet been made to apply this framework to
explain the effects of the target’s third-party rivals, a problem that is particularly
relevant to the sender’s strategic calculations about costs and gains. By shifting the
theoretical focus to the effects of the third-party (i.e., the target’s third-party rivals)
on sanctions onset, I argue that the study of the onset of the sanctions should focus on
the incentives and the expected behavior of the target state by taking third parties into
account. The third parties importantly shape the current international environment
in which the target state needs to survive with the optimal political priority and thus
play a significant role in affecting sanctions onset. This chapter argues that targets
that are involved in an ongoing interstate rivalry are more vulnerable to potential
sanctions. This is because third-party rivals limit the target states’ capability to evade
the intended economic costs of the coercion as the targets are motivated to devote
their finite resources to prevent power shifts and attacks from their adversaries with
11

All probability changes are calculated as (probability with third-party rival presence
- probability without third-party rival presence)/probability without third-party
rival presence, multiplied by 100.
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higher political priority compared to resisting potential sanctions. In turn, senders
are more likely to use sanctions when the current international environment favors
their bargaining positions during sanctions afterward. The theoretical model and the
empirical findings demonstrate that sanctions are more likely to be used if targets
have third-party rivals and when these rivals have greater military capabilities and
higher credibility to attack the targets. Additionally, sanctions are more likely to
be used when the sender and the target’s third-party rivals share a similar political
interest. My findings help us better understand why countries like Iran and North
Korea are frequently sanctioned in history. It is because these countries are involved
in a salient interstate rivalry with third countries, and it is difficult for them to reach
any peaceful settlement on current disputes.

Table 2.1: Variants of the Dependent Variable in Chapter 2
Variable name
Time span
Use TIES dataset
1960-2005
1. Initiation of any imposition
2. Initiation of imposition (involving security issues)
3. Initiation of any sanctions episodes
4. Initiation of sanctions episodes (involving security issues)
5. Initiation of any threat
6. Initiation of threat (involving security issues)
Use newly coded ICEWS dataset
1995-2012
1. Initiation of any sanctions episodes
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Table 2.2: Coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds examining imposition
onset (TIES), 1960-2005, including sanctions involving non-economic and nonenvironmental issues
Imposition
Model 1
Model 2
0.69∗∗∗
(0.47, 0.90)

State invovled in third-party rivalry?
Rivalry X (1 - Reciprocation rate)

−0.06
(−0.30, 0.19)
0.48
(−1.29, 2.25)
1.29∗∗∗
(0.52, 2.07)
−0.00∗∗
(−0.00, −0.00)
−0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−0.01
(−0.04, 0.02)
−3.10∗∗∗
(−3.65, −2.54)
3.63∗∗∗
(3.34, 3.93)
0.28∗∗
(0.05, 0.52)
−0.01
(−0.07, 0.04)
−0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−5.79∗∗∗
(−6.36, −5.21)
683,212
−2,469.39

Third-party ally presence
Trade/sender GDP
Trade/target GDP
GDP ratio
CINC ratio
Polity ratio
UN voting similarity
US sender
Ongoing sanctions
Years since sanction
Years2
Years3
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood

∗∗∗

0.78∗∗∗
(0.52, 1.05)
−0.05
(−0.29, 0.20)
0.48
(−1.32, 2.28)
1.27∗∗∗
(0.48, 2.05)
−0.00∗∗
(−0.00, −0.00)
−0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−0.01
(−0.04, 0.02)
−3.11∗∗∗
(−3.67, −2.56)
3.64∗∗∗
(3.34, 3.93)
0.30∗∗
(0.06, 0.53)
−0.02
(−0.07, 0.04)
−0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−5.73∗∗∗
(−6.30, −5.16)
683,212
−2,472.38

Significant at the 1 percent level.
Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗
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Table 2.3: Coefficients and 95 percent confidence bounds examining episode initiation (TIES), 1960-2005, including sanctions involving non-economic and nonenvironmental issues
Episode initiation
Model 5
Model 6
0.60∗∗∗
(0.42, 0.77)

State invovled in third-party rivalry?
Rivalry X (1 - Reciprocation rate)
Third-party ally presence

0.12
(−0.09, 0.32)
0.75∗∗
(0.05, 1.44)
0.73∗
(−0.08, 1.54)
−0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−0.00∗∗
(−0.00, −0.00)
−0.04∗∗∗
(−0.06, −0.01)
−3.31∗∗∗
(−3.76, −2.86)
3.57∗∗∗
(3.32, 3.81)
0.20∗∗
(0.01, 0.39)
−0.04∗
(−0.08, 0.00)
0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−5.12∗∗∗
(−5.58, −4.66)
683,212
−3,538.30

Trade/sender GDP
Trade/target GDP
GDP ratio
CINC ratio
Polity ratio
UN voting similarity
US sender
Ongoing sanctions
Years since sanction
Years2
Years3
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood

∗∗∗

0.68∗∗∗
(0.47, 0.90)
0.12
(−0.08, 0.33)
0.75∗∗
(0.05, 1.45)
0.71∗
(−0.11, 1.53)
−0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−0.00∗∗
(−0.00, −0.00)
−0.03∗∗
(−0.06, −0.01)
−3.33∗∗∗
(−3.78, −2.88)
3.57∗∗∗
(3.33, 3.82)
0.21∗∗
(0.02, 0.40)
−0.04∗
(−0.08, 0.00)
0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
0.00
(−0.00, 0.00)
−5.08∗∗∗
(−5.53, −4.62)
683,212
−3,541.62

Significant at the 1 percent level.
Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗
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Figure 2.1: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals from Models 1-4.

Table 2.4: Change in Predicted Probabilities of Sanction Onset (No third-party rival
vs. Third-party rival)

Sanctions imposition
Sanctions episode

Non-US dyads
∆ Probability ∆ Percent
0.000088
90.43%
0.00012
72.11%
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US dyads
∆ Probability ∆ Percent
0.0026
89.94%
0.0034
71.54%
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Figure 2.2: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals from Models 5-8.
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Chapter 3
Sanctions and Rivals: How Third-Party Rivals Affect the Sanctions
Outcomes
The expectations of the target’s third-party rivals’ behaviors of taking violent and
aggressive actions towards the target state are likely to guide the decision of the
target’s resistance following economic coercion. This is because the target’s reactions
(such as acquiescence or resistance) to sanctions also convey information to her thirdparty rivals. Specifically, in this chapter, I argue that the target state is less likely
to acquiesce following sanctions episodes if the target has active third-party rivals
because backing down signals weakness to rivals and invites aggressions, which could
further hurt the target’s economy and the political survival. The target state is
motivated to misrepresent her capabilities and resolve when involved in an interstate
rivalry with third states by resisting sanctions. I find strong evidence supporting
my claim in statistical tests of sanctions cases between 1960 and 2005. My results
have implications for scholars and policymakers alike, the most important of which
is a recommendation to consider a larger domain of sanctions effectiveness, signaling,
reputation, and resolve. Expanding from the traditional way of examining sanctions
effectiveness on a sender-target basis, we should also consider the possible impact of
the third parties that can take future aggressive actions against the target state on
the bargaining process between the sender and the target during sanctions episodes.
I proceed with this chapter to discuss the determinants of sanctions success and
the link between sanctions and third-party militarized conflict. I then present my
theoretical argument, in which I develop my hypotheses connecting the presence of
the target’s third-party rivals and the expectations of the target’s strategic response
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to sanctions episodes. Next, I outline my research design, in which I use the Threat
and Imposition of Sanctions (TIES) data (Morgan et al. 2009) to test my hypotheses.
Finally, I present my analysis and discuss the implications of my results for theory
and policy.
3.1

Determinants of Sanctions Success

Senders apply economic pressure to induce the target’s political leadership to comply
with their demands. Historically, studies of economic sanctions tend to focus on sanctions effectiveness and conclude that sanctions rarely succeed in forcing the target to
make policy changes.1 To explain when sanctions are more likely to be effective, one
strand of the literature has focused on the interaction between the sender and the
target state, analyzing their domestic features and strategic behaviors. This body
of scholarship demonstrates that economic coercion is more effective between allies
than between rival countries because allies are more inclined to maintain their relatively strong political and strategic ties with the sender by making concessions to
the sender’s demands. On the other hand, rival states might defy foreign pressure
due to future conflict expectations as well as possible repetitional costs of capitulation (Drezner 1998; 1999; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Whang 2010). Additionally, studies
theoretically expect that close economic ties between senders and targets would create more incentives for the targets to concede to external pressure. The structural
assumption in the literature on trade and politics holds that political leaders hope to
retain welfare gains from trade and could be punished for not doing so. Yet, most
studies find counterintuitive results that the degree of the target’s economic depen1

As mentioned in the Introduction Chapter at the beginning, the remainder of this
dissertation (i.e., chapters 3 and 4) mostly favors the interpretation of sanctions
effectiveness of those that result in full target compliance or policy change in line
with the stated policy objectives of senders. Sanctions are successful tools about 10%
of the time according to this interpretation of effective sanctions (Hufbauer et al.
2007; Morgan et al. 2014). Statistical tests results are consistent when applying the
lower threshold of sanctions success.
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dence on its sender has no significant effect on the target’s decision to resist or to
acquiesce following sanctions episodes (Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Drury 1998; Whang
2010; Bapat et al. 2013; Jeong and Peksen 2019) possibly due to the leak of economic
coercions (Andreas 2005; Early 2009; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013; Early and Spice
2015; Peksen and Peterson 2016; Early and Peksen 2018). In cases, targets might survive pressure by developing new trade and investment ties with third-party countries
(Early 2009; 2015; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013; Peksen and Peterson 2016). Targets
could also use black markets and other transnational illicit channels to access scarce
goods and products or sell their own products to survive in sanctions (Andreas 2005;
Early and Peksen 2018). Others find that democracies are more likely to make concessions than dictatorships in sanctions episodes because democratic leaders are more
representative of the public and responsible for trade gains. In contrast, autocratic
leaders tend to be more defiant as they often escape the intended costs of the coercion
to themselves and their support base by adopting repression or co-optation (Brooks
2002; Kaempfer et al. 2004; Allen 2005; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Allen 2008b; Major
2012; Peksen 2019).
Another branch of the literature highlights the significant role of international
institutions and the target’s third-party allies in sanctions outcomes, looking beyond
the sender-target base scope in determining sanctions effectiveness. This body of
scholarship shows that institutionalized cooperation contributes to sanctions effectiveness because institutionalized sanctions reduce the extent of “sanctions-busting”
by opportunistic third-party government and private actors (Early 2011; Early and
Spice 2015). Additionally, international institutions could better monitor the enforcement of sanctions regimes to increase their effectiveness (Martin 1993; Drezner 2000;
Miers and Clifton 2002; Drezner 2003; Bapat and Morgan 2009). Looking into the
variation of the target’s third-party allies, Peksen and Peterson (2016) discover the
relationship between the target’s allies’ economic capabilities and sanctions effective-
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ness. These authors demonstrate that the U.S. is less likely to sanction its trade
partners with wealthier allies (partially due to its few expectations of sanctions success). Within this scope of analysis looking beyond the sender-target relationship in
terms of sanctions effectiveness, the role of the target’s third-party rivals is completely
overlooked.
Perhaps the most important finding of modern sanctions research is that successful sanctions are more likely to end at the threat stage since targets prefer to avoid
costs associated with potential conflict and imposed sanctions (Drezner 2003) while
empirical studies that only examine cases in which sanctions were imposed are flawed
(Smith 1995; Eaton and Engers 1999; Lacy and Niou 2004). Following the compilation
of the TIES data set (Morgan et al. 2014) which allowed sanctions scholars to address
the selection bias resulting from the previously commonly used sanctions data (i.e.,
(Hufbauer et al. 2007)), the emerging formal models of threat effectiveness (Drezner
2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Whang et al. 2013) start guiding empirical research on
threats effectiveness with the emphasis on coercion, information, and public commitment. Sanctions threats are more likely to succeed as the expected cost to the target
of a sanctions regime increases (Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Drury 1998; Schultz
1999; Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Whang et al. 2013; Bapat and Kwon 2015;
Whang and Kim 2015). Sanctions threats are effective when they successfully change
the target’s belief about the resolve of the sender (Schultz 1999; Whang et al. 2013)
and when resolve is better signaled as the diplomatic distance between the sender and
the target decreases (Spaniel and Smith 2015; Katagiri and Min 2019; Walentek et al.
2021). At last, democratic senders who experience a higher domestic audience cost
are more likely to succeed at the threat stage (Kertzer and Brutger 2016; Gartzke
et al. 2017; Bas and Schub 2018). Furthermore, some factors, for example, the types
of policy objectives, may contribute to the success of imposed sanctions but not mere
threats (Lindsay 1986; Hufbauer et al. 2007; Ang and Peksen 2007). Additionally,
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Peksen (2019) finds evidence that military regimes and single-party regimes are less
likely to acquiesce following sanctions imposition while sanctions against personalist regimes are as effective in achieving their intended goals as sanctions directed at
democratic regimes. In this sense, personalist regimes are inclined to acquiesce to
foreign pressure due to their lack of strong institutional capacity to weather the costs
of the sanctions. My theories developed in this chapter apply to a broader study of
sanctions episodes (including both sanctions threats and imposed sanctions) given
my focus on the target’s strategic response to sanctions rather than the de jure and
de facto costs associated with threats and imposition, respectively.2
Sanctions convey a great deal of information of the senders’ reluctance to employ
their militaries (Hoffman 1967; Schwebach 2000) or a rather strong resolve of taking
possible military actions with strong dissatisfaction with the target as senders willingly impose costs on themselves when they use sanctions (Baldwin 1985; Drezner
1998). Studies also show that sanctions can convey information to third parties by
signaling the sender’s disapproval with the target (Doxey 1972) and, consequently,
increase the likelihood of third-party countries’ militarized violence against the target
(Peterson and Drury 2011). Existing literature constrains our understanding of the
signaling effects of sanctions as such signaling is most of the time interpreted as monodirectional.3 By mono-directional, it means that sanctions only convey information to
the target state and the third parties when the sender uses sanctions (Peterson 2013;
2014; Miller 2014). Subsequently, after sanctions are levied, the target state and the
stakeholders (i.e., the third parties of interest) take actions in accordance with how
2

My theories also apply to sanctions threats effectiveness and sanctions imposition
effectiveness separately. Results from the statistical tests are consistent when looking
at threats and imposition separately as shown in the Appendix.

3

Peksen and Peterson (2016)’s study on sanctions initiation sheds some light on the
opposite direction to look at the signaling effect, arguing that the (possible) targets’
wealthier allies signal the easiness for target states to escape the intended costs of
the coercion and for the senders to not employ sanctions.
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they read this information conveyed by sanctions episodes. The role of third parties
(i.e., especially rival states discussed in this chapter) in the literature on sanctions
effectiveness is overlooked as the learning process (among the sender, the target, and
the third parties) continues before the target responds to economic coercion rationally
and strategically following sanctions onset. Strategically, the target’s response (of either acquiescence or resistance) following sanctions episodes also signals the target’s
resolve on the issues involved in current sanctions not only to the direct sender(s) but
to the other states (especially the target’s adversaries) which are not directly involved
in the sanctions episodes as well. Consequently, a rational target should notice that
the way how they decide to respond would signal its resolve on the issues especially
involved in current sanctions and its capabilities. Eventually, the target’s response
affects the third parties’ decision to apply similar sanctions as a solution to deal with
their adversaries (i.e., the target) or even initiate attacks during this learning process. Target acquiescence signals third parties that coercive economic measures are
likely to elicit concessions from the target state. Therefore, I expect that the target
state would strategically use her response to current sanctions episodes to signal their
resolve and positions on certain issues, especially to inform their major adversaries
of the target’s resolve and capability. I then expect a connection between the target’s active rival(s) and the target’s response to current sanctions (which determines
sanctions effectiveness).
3.2

Signaling to Third-party Rivals and Sanctions Effectiveness

Signaling has been studied in the context of the bargaining theory of war and sanctions
alike, where both actors are better off with a negotiated settlement rather than paying
the costs of fighting or using sanctions. A rich game-theoretic literature explains how
actors can signal credibly in various situations using sanctions, and emerging research
also discovers the third-party signaling effect of sanctions (Peterson 2013; 2014; Miller
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2014). However, the possibility that the target could also utilize its response to current
sanctions to signal its third-party rivals is overlooked.
Signaling occurs when one actor knows something relevant to another actor’s
decisions (Morrow 1999). As long as states are rational, the target state is motivated
to respond to sanctions strategically and alter strategic interactions with third states,
especially its adversaries. In this chapter, I argue that the target uses sanctions
resistance to signal its resolve and capability to its third-party rivals to prevent attacks
or sanctions from third states.
Rival states often pose credible security threats to the target country compared
to those that remain peaceful relations with the target (Klein et al. 2008). Facing
the question of whether to resist economic coercion, the target state needs to take
its third-party rivals into account because the response to sanctions conveys information and has a signaling effect on the third parties’ decision-making, such as using
military forces or sanctions against the target to solve disputes. Evidence shows that
the target of sanctions threats looks to the sender’s actions against prior resistant
targets as sender’s backing down in history infers empty threats which harm sanctions effectiveness (Peterson 2013). Therefore, a rational target should respond to
sanctions strategically as its response to current sanctions could signal its resolve on
issues involved in current sanctions and convey specific information to its third-party
adversaries. Therefore, when the target has active rivals other than the sender, the
decision to make concessions to the sender’s demands releases information that could
weaken the target’s resolve on certain political issues involved in sanctions and put
the target at a disadvantage in negotiations on similar issues with its third-party
adversaries if any. First, sanctions break the trade ties that bind states to each other
or convey to potential aggressors that the ties are broken. Therefore, target acquiescence in sanctions episodes signals the target’s economic vulnerability or at least the
unwillingness to bear economic damage for resistance. Second, making concessions
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to the sender’s demands signals that the issues involved in the current sanctions are
negotiable. Anyhow, target acquiescence increases the likelihood of third-party rivals’
confidence in taking some (similar) aggressive actions towards the targets. That is
because these rivals are more likely to elicit concessions and force the targets to alter
their policies, given the fact that issues involved in current sanctions are negotiable
and the target state will be unwilling to bear economic losses for resistance. From
the target’s perspective, there is not much difference in the importance between the
sender and the third-party rivals when the target needs to decide whether to resist
if the sender happens to be the target’s rival. Eventually, the target should respond
strategically, considering its third-party rivals, if any, because the primary sender has
made specific coercive actions towards the target once sanctions are either threatened or imposed. In contrast, its third-party rivals’ move is uncertain and can be
affected by the target’s response. In other words, the sender’s behavior is fixed while
third-party rivals’ is still uncertain during sanctions episodes. Following the sanctions
episodes, the target should concern more about the uncertain (but foreseeable) aggressive actions that are very likely to be taken by its third-party rivals before the target
decides how to respond to current sanctions.4 The decision of whether to acquiesce
in current sanctions depends on not only the calculation of how much the target will
suffer (from the direct sender(s)) if the target resists but also a question of how much
they will suffer (from the third-party rival states) if they acquiesce. The first concern
can be addressed from the trade ties between the target and the sender(s). However,
to answer the second question, we need to examine the third-party rivals’ likelihood,
capabilities, and credibility of taking potential aggressive actions against the target.
The target is more vulnerable and more likely to be invaded by its third-party countries (especially its rivals) not involved in the current sanctions when it is sanctioned
4

Peterson and Drury (2011) find that imposed sanctions both weaken and stigmatize
the target, inviting attacks.
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because (imposed) sanctions both weaken and stigmatize the target (Peterson and
Drury 2011) and invite attacks. When a state is sanctioned, its third-party rivals
then pose credible security threats to take violent or non-violent actions towards the
target. Consequently, if the target is rational, the presence of the target’s active
third-party rivals is expected to have a significant impact on the target’s response to
current sanctions as the response could be used as a means of signaling.
For instance, with an average of six active rivals (such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Iran) between 1945 and 2005, Israel is one of the targets
with the most active rivals.5 Israel has been frequently sanctioned in history. According to the TIES’s records, 36 sanctions were either threatened or imposed against
Israel between 1945 and 2005. Thirty-five of these sanctions involve security issues.
In the 1990s, Israel has been unilaterally sanctioned by the United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Iraq. However, Israel rarely acquiesces in any of these sanctions
attempts, especially in Arab countries’ sanctions.6 The presence of a large number of
active rivals makes Israel’s acquiescence in these sanctions episodes difficult and even
impossible, although Israel suffers a great deal of economic damage. Israel has been
sanctioned mainly due to its refusal to withdraw from the occupied territories and
refusal to remove the separation barrier in the West Bank. Israel’s acquiescence in
any single sanctions attempt would signal Israel’s active rivals that Israel is no longer
able to bear further economic damage or the security issue, which is the core interests
of Israel, turns to be negotiable. Whatever the above information read by Israel’s
rivals following Israel’s acquiescence, it encourages Israel’s active (third-party) rivals
to take further coercive actions with optimism to solve disputes with Israel given
Israel’s economic vulnerability and the government’s reluctance to resist on security
5

The mean of the target’s active third-party rival states is 2.5.

6

Among the 36 sanctions attempts, Israel only made concessions to the US sanctions
four times and institutionalized sanctions three times.
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issues implied by Israel’s acquiescence. At least, the signals conveyed to the thirdparty rivals put Israel at a disadvantage in future negotiations with its rivals as Israel
behaved in a shaky way on some issues regarding its core interests if Israel acquiesces.
The same logic can be used to explain at least in part of North Korea’s and Iran’s
frequently being sanctioned and resistance in sanctions episodes historically.
Additionally, sanctions against South Korea also demonstrate the discrepancy between sanctions use and sanctions efficacy, which has been historically overlooked.
Starting in the 1990s, South Korea was frequently sanctioned by the United States,
India, Canada, Germany, China, Colombia, and Indonesia. However, South Korea
seldom made any acquiescence to these senders’ demands. Considering the international environment in which South Korea survives, the interstate rivalry (with Japan
and North Korea) might play an important role in impelling South Korea’s resistance
against sanctions. South Korea and Japan have unsolved territorial disputes over
the Liancourt Rocks. Both countries claim sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, a
group of small islets in the Sea of Japan, which are referred to as “Dokdo” in Korean
and “Takeshima” in Japanese. Additionally, the decades-long conflict between South
Korea and North Korea is more salient, threatening to reach a breaking point any
time. Given the fierce international environment in which South Korea survives, the
country is motivated to misrepresent its resolve and capabilities to its two major adversaries of Japan and North Korea, which have strong military strength, by resisting
ongoing sanctions.7
7

According to the 2021 Global Firepower military strength report, Japan is ranked the
fifth most militarily powerful country. North Korea has one of the largest standing
armies in the world, with more than one million soldiers and estimated reserves of
some five million in 2021.
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3.2.1

Target Resistance: Fear, Scapegoat, and a Commitment
Problem

Building upon Fearon (1995)’s contribution to the bargaining scholarship, I theorize
the third-party rivals’ effects on target acquiescence (or resistance) following sanctions episodes focusing on how the external threats and “fear” motivate the target to
misrepresent its capabilities and resolve. I argue that target resistance is a means of
signaling the resolve to prevent itself from attacking by potential aggressors.
External rivals can also serve as a focal point for nationalist sentiments. Politicians
can benefit politically by rallying constituents around a common external threat (of
the primary sender) that can also serve as a convenient scapegoat to distract attention
from domestic problems. On the other hand, a state with no rivals has less incentive
to bear economic costs and thus sees little value in prolonging being sanctioned.
In either case, discussed above, the target country’s strategic priorities determine
whether they are willing to be bearing costs associated with sanctions. When the
attention and resources of a target are not focused on the pursuit of an interstate
rivalry, sanctions could possibly be effective. However, when the target is part of an
interstate rivalry, the sanctions will be counterproductive for the reasons described
above.
Additionally, the sender states attach conditions on sanctions removal, which the
target must fulfill if it wishes to alleviate sanctions by the sender. For the sender,
this is the most attractive (or at least a commonly used) strategy to induce target
acquiescence, as it is relatively cheaper compared to costly wars (Fearon 1995; 1997;
Whang and Kim 2015). However, for conditionality to serve as an effective coercive
mechanism, carrots of removing sanctions must be viewed by the target as credible
(Bapat 2011; Boutton 2014). When the target state has active third-party rivals,
such conditionality for sanctions removal is often not credible, given the findings that
third-party rivals invite sanctions in chapter 2. Additionally, political leaders from
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the sender are often under considerable domestic political pressure to “do something”
about sanctions threats to serve the sender country’s political interests, which are well
known as “playing to the home crowd”(Whang 2011). Therefore, sanctions recurrence
is likely when the target is an easy target by having third-party rivals, and sanctions
removal is not credible. The story I tell here is that when a sender such as the
U.S. uses sanctions against the target country, which faces salient security threats,
the target country’s strategic priorities determine whether they will be bearing costs
associated with sanctions.
With the premise that interstate rivalry deserves the highest political priority
of the target state, I expect the target to be less likely to make concessions to the
sender’s demands when the target has active third-party rivals, excluding the primary
sender(s). Based on the reasoning discussed above, the first hypothesis is specified as
follows:
Hypothesis 4. The target is more likely to resist sanctions when she is involved in
interstate rivalry with third states.
The additional refinement to my theory is the credible threat effect. As the target’s third-party rivals’ national and economic capabilities increase, it is more likely
for these third-party rivals to use military forces and coercive economic measures as a
solution to solve their disputes with the target state. The target state could signal to
its third-party rivals that the sanctioned state is economically healthy and politically
resolved, therefore, a formidable target by resisting sanctions, which involve security
issues. Strategically, from the target’s perspective, target acquiescence would be expected to decrease the likelihood of third-party rivals attacking the target and using
sanctions because the target behaves as it can easily evade sanctions. At the same
time, the third-party rivals also need to bear the costs associated with aggressive
behaviors though capable, which makes aggressive behaviors inferior choices. Target
acquiesce in sanctions because they need to prevent (potential) economic damage or
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minimize economic damage from current sanctions used by the sender. The target
resists sanctions because they hope to prevent future and further economic damage
caused possibly by its third-party rivals. Target state would resist stoutly in current
sanctions if its third-party rivals are economically and militarily powerful because
powerful enemies make the possible attacks more credible. On the other hand, target acquiescence might favor the third-party rivals’ bargaining position if the target
reveals its vulnerable economy and indecisive resolve by making concessions to the
current sender’s demands on security issues. Therefore, the third-party rivals’ strong
capabilities and their history of using military forces strengthen the third-party rivals’
credibility of attacking the target. To prevent possible attacks from its third-party
rivals. A rational target must consider the signaling effects of its reaction to sanctions
and signal its capability and resolve by resisting sanctions. Consequently, the more
credible these security threats posed by third parties are, the less likely the target
will reveal its economic vulnerability by making concessions to the current sender’s
demands. My second and third hypothesis follows:
Hypothesis 5. The target is more likely to resist sanctions as the capability and credibility of attacks from her adversaries increase.
Hypothesis 6. The target is more likely to resist when the sender has similar political
interests with the target’s third-party rivals.
3.2.2

Sanctions Onset, Target Acquiescence, and Backwards
Induction

One might argue that senders are supposed to be engaged in the backward induction associated with the target’s expected response in chapter 2. My responses are
discussed from the following different aspects. First, theoretically, sanctions put a
hardship on the target’s international trade and economy and therefore invite attacks
by third parties (Peterson and Drury 2011). Therefore, third parties’ possible economic coercion and potential attacks following current sanctions together favor the
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sender’s bargaining position during sanctions episodes no matter whether the target
acquiesces. Second, the possible senders and the third-party rivals are not necessarily
always facing a free-riding problem because the demands from multiple stakeholders
are rarely consistent (Bapat and Morgan 2009). Third, sanctions could be used as
means of “playing to the home crowd” (Whang 2011). And if it were the case, then
the target’s expected response might not be a major calculation of the costs and benefits associated with foreign policymaking before implementing sanctions. Fourth,
senders utilize the signaling effects of sanctions on third parties (Peterson 2013; 2014;
Miller 2014) to ignite the powder keg. In an ideal case, when the target is extremely
vulnerable to sanctions facing powerful third-party rivals, the sender seizes the opportunity and threatens sanctions against the target. The target concedes on the issue,
knowing that failure to comply will lead to an even worse outcome, such as fighting
against the rivals under sanctions. In contrast, if the target faces no external security
threats, sanctions are unlikely to coerce compliance because the target can utilize all
its resources to evade the costs associated with sanctions and find alternative markets more easily in a benign international environment. The sender fails to threaten
sanctions because she knows that the strategy will prove ineffective. However, the
sender will never know the true capability of the target state due to asymmetric
information. The corresponding uncertainty gives weaker target incentives to bluff
strength. Faced with this uncertainty, the sender sometimes imposes sanctions to
catch potential bluffers (Spaniel and Smith 2015).
3.3

Data and Research Design

To capture the third-party rivals’ effects on the target’s decision-making in sanctions
episodes, I only focus on unilateral sanctions cases in which the sovereign state is
the target.8 I also exclude those cases in which an international institution is a pri8

Looking at unilateral sanctions allows me to isolate the possible third-party rivals’
effects on the target state’s behavior.
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mary sender.9 Additionally, I removed sanctions cases in which the only issue at
stake is related to trade or environmental policy, given the potentially distinct–and
less severe–nature of trade disputes (Drezner 2003). Looking at sanctions episodes
involving hi-politics issues is also consistent with my conceptualization of rivalry characterized by militarization. I also look into sanctions threats and imposed sanctions
in separate models in order to speak to a broader existing literature on sanctions
effectiveness with different focuses.10
The unit of analysis is the case. The dependent variable is target acquiescence. I
code two variants of acquiescence, the first of which is equal to 1 if TIES records the
outcome of the sanctions as complete acquiescence to the sender’s demand (that is,
where the TIES final outcome variable is equal to 2 or 7), and otherwise equal to 0.11
The second measure of acquiescence is relaxed, coded as equal to 1 when the target
acquiesces fully or partially to the sender’s demands (that is, where the final outcome
variable in TIES is equal to 1, 2, 6, or 7).12 Given the construction of these binary
dependent variables, I use generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a logit link
9

Excluding cases in which international institutions initiate sanctions helps me to
identify the target’s third-party rivals.

10

The majority of sanctions efficacy literature focuses on threatened sanctions since
Drezner (2003) while scholars emphasize imposed sanctions applying the Heckman
selection models.

11

According to TIES, 2 denotes “complete acquiescence by the target to threat” and
7 denotes “total acquiescence by target state following sanctions imposition.” These
variables examine acquiescence in either the threat or imposition stage of the sanctions episode. In models presented in the Appendix, I demonstrate that results look
essentially identical if I code the dependent variable is equal to 1 only in cases when
the target acquiescence during the threat stage (excluding the imposed sanctions).

12

In TIES, 1 denotes “partial acquiescence by the target to a threat” and 6 denotes
“partial acquiescence by the target state following sanctions imposition.”
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function that includes random intercepts for target states to access support for my
hypotheses.13
In an admittedly oversimplified scenario, the sender only chooses to impose sanctions if its expected payoff would exceed the sender’s costs associated with sanctions.
Otherwise, sanctions are not worth it to the sender, and the sender falls back on other
statecrafts (such as foreign aid, cyber strategy, etc.) Then the sample of imposed sanctions, for which we observe outcomes, is selected from those in the population which
are less likely to succeed and associated with relatively low sender costs because target
states are more likely to concede to foreign pressure when they are threatened with
sanctions (Nooruddin 2002; Drezner 2003; Lacy and Niou 2004; Drury and Li 2006).
To address the sample-selection bias, I use and compare logit models, generalized
linear mixed-effects models with random intercepts for the target state, modified selection models, and strategic selection models (presented in the appendix) to increase
13

As a robustness check, in the Appendix, I use ordered logit regressions in which I
specify an ordinal outcome variable, where no acquiescence is coded as 0, partial
acquiescence is coded as 1, and complete acquiescence is coded as 2. Given that
third-party rivals affect both sanctions onset and target acquiescence, one might
assume that the potential initiator in chapter 2 would engage in backward induction
associated with the expected response from the target in chapter 3. That is, the
senders leverage third-party rivals when considering whether to impose sanctions,
while targets simultaneously refuse to back down under these conditions. If it is the
case, strategic selection into sanctions onset is an important factor that could lead
to bias in models examining sanctions episodes as if they were randomly selected
events. However, I decided not to rely on strategic selection models(Signorino 2002)
for two reasons. Theoretically, sanctions could be used as a means of “playing to the
home crowd” (Whang 2011) while not always necessarily being used strategically to
purpose foreign policy goals. Empirically, selection models create problems with the
unit of analysis. The unit of analysis for my onset equation in chapter 2 is the dyad
year. I aggregate the case data (TIES and ICEWS) to code the onset of at least one
sanctions onset in that dyad year. However, in my target acquiescence equation in
chapter 3, the unit of analysis is the case. It turns out to be a tricky proposition to
aggregate the outcome indicators since it matters to whom the target acquiesces,
as selection models require the combination of my onset and outcome equations.
As a robustness check, the coefficient results from strategic selection models are
consistent with the results from my main models though there is a problem with
the unit of analysis. See Appendix for more details.
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confidence that my results are not an artifact from biased sample observations. An
alternative statistical method to accomplish the same results as the Heckman model
(as it is unclear that a good variable exists that would satisfy the exclusion restriction
in a two-stage model) is to estimate the selection model using maximum likelihood
(ML) for both equations simultaneously.14
3.3.1

Coding Threats of Potential Aggressive Actions

The primary explanatory variables measure the potential aggressive actions taken by
the target’s third-party rivals against the target, adopted from the variables used in
chapter 2. The first explanatory variable of third-party rival is the presence of the
potential target’s active rival(s) excluding the primary sender state–operationalized
as a dichotomous variable equal to one when the state maintains a peace scale below
0.25 with at least one other state (Klein et al. 2008), otherwise zero.15 My second
explanatory variable is rivals’ attacking credibility. To code this variable, I adopt
Weeks (2008)’s measurement of audience cost. The variable RECIP in the Militarized
Interstate Disputes (MID) data set takes value one if the target state responded with
a militarized action, and zero if the target state made no militarized response to
the challenger’s threat or use of force (Schultz 1999; 2001). On average, one should
expect that initiators with a high ability to generate audience costs should be less
likely to face resistance than states with a low ability to generate audience costs.
Therefore, I aggregate the RECIP variable by the initiator, then divide the sum of
RECIP by the sum of MID initiations. The higher this reciprocation rate is, the
less capable of generating audience costs, and thus less attacking credibility. In my
model, the “Rivalry x (1-Reciprocation rate)” variable measures the target’s third14

These selection models assume a known distribution (i.e., multivariate normal) of
error terms. Because of this, the instruments (i.e., exclusion restrictions) are not
necessary (Henningsen and Toomet 2008).

15

The peace scale has values 0.0 – serious rivalry, .25 – lesser rivalry, .50 – negative
peace, .75 – warm peace, and 1.0 – security community. These categories and the
coding criteria are described in detail in (Goertz et al. 2016).
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party rivals’ (if any) attacking credibility by using the average Reciprocation rate of
these rivals. The third variant calculates the sum of the Composite Index of National
Capabilities (CINC) score (Singer et al. 1972) of the potential target’s third-party
rivals. This score incorporates information on population, urban population, military
expenditure, military personnel, coal and steel production, and energy consumption.
Additionally, in the Appendix, I also measure the relative capability of rivals to the
target state instead of using the target’s absolute capability as the relative capability
measures the rivals’ leverage against the target. The results remain consistent. The
last variant of the primary explanatory variable presented in the main dissertation
document captures the ties between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals. The
Rivalry x Sender-rivals average UN voting similarity variable measures the average
political interest similarity between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals (if
any). Using the United Nations (UN) voting data set (Gartzke 1998; Strezhnev and
Voeten 2013), I also calculate the maximum and minimum of the UN voting similarity
between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals, respectively (presented in the
Appendix), to capture the political ties between the sender and the rivals.
3.3.2

Control Variables

I also include a battery of control variables to account for the major covariates of
sanctions effectiveness. First of all, I control the presence of the target’s third-party
ally.The targets are less vulnerable to sanctions when their allies (if any) are wealthy
countries. These targets are expected to be more defiant following sanctions (Peksen
and Peterson 2016) compared to those without economically powerful allies. The
presence of the target’s third-party rivals captures the possibility that its allies defend the target during sanctions. The COW Formal Alliance (v.4.1) data (Gibler
2009) is used to capture third-party commitments to defend the target.16 Alterna16

Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances. The network method allows going beyond the dyadic approach and capturing greater variation in international relations. See Cranmer et al. (2014) and Cranmer and Des62

tively, I adopt different variants of the alliance variable in models where my primary
explanatory variable varies.17
Next, I control for the target’s likely costs associated with sanctions. Specifically,
I create the trade/target GDP variable, which is calculated by using the target’s total
trade (exports and imports) with the primary sender divided by the target’s GDP,
using COW’s Bilateral Trade Dataset (v4.0) (Barbieri and Keshk 2012). It assesses
the extent of a target state’s reliance on trade with the sender given that sanctions
should be more effective when the target’s economy depends largely on the sender
(Galtung 1967).
I include five additional dummy variables. The first dummy variable identifies
the target’s regime type. I identify democratic targets with a dichotomous variable coded as one if a target’s 21-point combined Polity score is greater than six,
while non-democracies are those with Polity combined scores equal to or less than six
(Marshall and Jaggers 2014). I also include a variable to distinguish institutionalized
sanctions from those initiated by states to capture episode-specific features. The institutionalized sanction variable is directly adopted from TIES. This variable takes
a dichotomous measurement equal to 1 when an international institution sponsors
sanctions, otherwise 0. Given the potentially greater legitimacy of these sanctions
and better sanctions implementation, sanctions with international institutions’ cooperation are more effective (Bapat and Morgan 2009; Early and Spice 2015). In
marais (2016) for examples. However, since it is unclear how third-party allies might
act collectively to defend the target state, I only adopt the dichotomous measure
for dyadic alliance relationship between target and its third-party allies to capture
the possibility of being supported during sanctions.
17

In the Appendix, the control variable for the target’s third-party allies’ propensity is
adjusted accordingly with the variants of my primary explanatory variable included
in different models, i.e., the sum of third-party allies’ CINC, log of the sum of
third-party allies’ GDP, third-party major-power rival presence, etc. See appendix
for details. My results are robust when I control the third-party rival presence
consistently in different models without the adjustments.
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models focusing on imposed sanctions, I also include the threat variable in my models
to test whether sanctions with a prior threat stage (i.e., threatened sanctions) are less
effective than those without a threat phase. This variable takes the value of 1 if a
sanction begins with a threat stage and 0 otherwise. In models with an emphasis on
threatened sanctions, I account for the sanctions imposition stage. The imposition
variable is equal to one if a sanction is eventually imposed, otherwise zero. Finally,
I identify the United States as a sender, given its unique status as a global hegemon
that uses sanctions often. The summary statistics are presented in the appendix.
3.4

Analysis

I find strong support for my main expectation that third-party rivals are associated
with a lower probability of the target’s acquiescence following sanctions episodes. Table 3.1 presents coefficients and 95% confidence bounds for nine models examining
the target’s acquiescence to the sender’s demands following sanctions episodes (excluding those involving economic and environmental issues), covering episodes that
begin between 1962 and 2005. Models 1, 2, 5, and 6 examine target’s acquiescence in
sanctions threats (no matter whether sanctions are eventually imposed), while Models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 examine target’s acquiescence in imposed sanctions. Models 1, 3,
5, and 7 only include the least variables, while Models 2, 4, 6, 8, and 9 include all my
controls as my full models.
Results from these nine models provide support for my hypothesis. Considering
coefficients, I find that third-party rival presence is negative and significant (p < 0.01)
in all nine models. As such, the target’s active third-party rivals, if any, appear to
decrease the probability that a target state acquiesces following sanctions episodes.
Since the quantity of coefficients in the logistic regression function delivers the logarithm of the odd, which does not convey the direct meaning of my research interest,
I turn to Figure 3.1 which presents two related plots that illustrate the substantive
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magnitude of my predictions for sanctions use from models 2 and 4, to better visualize
the predicted probabilities associated with the third-party rival presence.
These two plots in Figure 3.1 illustrates the predicted probabilities of the target’s
acquiescence (i.e., total acquiescence following sanctions threat and imposed sanctions,
respectively. In each plot, the probabilities of the target’s acquiescence are calculated
for the U.S. sender and non-U.S. senders separately: the U.S. sender on the left in red
and non-U.S. senders on the right in blue, as well as their 95% prediction intervals.
To calculate the corresponding predicted probabilities, I set a majority type of the
target, which has no third-party allies, has an autocratic regime type, is involved
in a sanctions case with no support from any international institution. The trade
dependence is set to be at the median value. The variables of threat, imposition, and
U.S. sender are adjusted accordingly when making different prediction plots.
The differences of target acquiescence probabilities between third-party rival presence and third-party rival absence are further illustrated.I examine changes in the
predicted probabilities of target acquiescence. The presented predicted probability
changes are calculated using Models 2 and 4 from Table 3.1 corresponding to Figure
3.1.
In the first two columns (i.e., under Non-US dyads), I hold the trade dependence
variable at its median level.18 The first two columns calculate target acquiescence
probabilities for non-US senders. I find that third-party rival(s) presence is associated
with approximately a 67.13% decrease in the probability of the target’s complete
acquiescence following sanctions threats.

19

The presence of third-party rival(s) is

18

The setting up for other control variables is consistent within Figure 3.1. I set
a majority type of the target, which has no third-party allies, has an autocratic
regime type, is involved in a sanctions case with no support from any international
institution.

19

All probability changes are calculated as (probability with third-party rival presence
- probability without third-party rival presence)/probability without third-party
rival presence, multiplied by 100.
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associated with approximately a 66.28% decrease in the probability of the target’s
complete acquiescence following sanctions imposition.
Moving to Table 3.2, I find strong support for my hypotheses 5 and 6 that the
target is more likely to resist sanctions as the capability and credibility of attacks
from these third-party rivals increase, and when the sender share similar political
interests with the target’s third-party rivals. Table 3.2 presents coefficients and 95%
confidence bounds for six models examining the target’s acquiescence to the sender’s
demands following sanctions episodes (excluding those only involving economic and
environmental issues), covering episodes that begin between 1962 and 2005. Models 1,
2, and 3 examine target’s acquiescence in sanctions threats (no matter whether sanctions are eventually imposed), while Models 4, 5, and 6 examine target’s acquiescence
in imposed sanctions.
In Models 1 and 4, from Table 3.2, the primary explanatory variable is the sum
of the target’s third-party rivals’ capabilities. I find preliminary evidence that the
higher capability of the third-party rival(s) suggests a lower likelihood that the target
acquiesces following sanctions episodes. Similarly, there is evidence that the credibility of the third-party’s use of military force against the target is negatively associated
with the target’s acquiescence in sanctions. Finally, I find evidence that the target is
less likely to acquiesce in sanctions threats when the sender and the target’s thirdparty rivals share similar political interests. I also use visualizations to provide a
complete explanation of probabilities and marginal effects associated with the thirdparty rival CINC variable, the credibility variable, and the variable measuring the
ties between the sender and the target’s third-party rivals. Specifically, Figure 3.2
illustrates the effects of third-party rival CINC, rivalry x (1-reciprocation rate), and
rivalry x sender-rivals average UN voting similarity as estimated in Models 1-6. In
the top three graphs in Figure 3.2, I graph the marginal effect of third-party rival
CINC, rivalry x (1-reciprocation rate), and rivalry x sender-rivals average UN vot-
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ing similarity on target acquiescence following sanctions threat. The bottom three
graphs in Figure 3.2 illustrate predicted probabilities of the target’s acquiescence following imposed sanctions as these three explanatory variables increase within their
ranges.These six graphs suggest that more the target state is more likely to resist sanctions when the attacks from its third-party rivals become more possible and credible.
These findings provide support for my hypotheses. Results from statistical models
also demonstrate support for my expectation that the close political ties between the
sender and the target’s third-party rivals are negatively associated with the target’s
likelihood of making concessions to the sender’s demands.
3.5

Conclusion

This chapter finds evidence that the target’s third-party rivals influence the target’s
decision-making following sanctions episodes. Target states have incentives to misrepresent their true resolve and capabilities when they are involved in an ongoing
international rivalry with third states. Target resistance following sanctions is an
ideal means to signal intense resolve to those third parties that are not directly involved in current sanctions episodes and distract attention from domestic tensions, if
any, due to the government’s inability to solve interstate disputes with third states.
Target’s third-party rivals also bring a sender commitment problem that sanctions
withdrawal is less credible, and sanctions recurrence is likely given the findings in
chapter 2. Therefore, a target state with (more powerful and credible) active thirdparty rival(s) is less likely to acquiesce to sanctions episodes.
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Table 3.1: Coefficient and 95 percent confidence bounds examining target acquiescence following sanctions episodes (excluding sanctions involving environmental and
economic issues)
Complete Acquiescence
Model 2
Model 4
Target invovled in third-party rivalry?
Third-party ally presence
Trade/target GDP
Democracy
Autocracy
Institutional sanction

−0.72∗∗
(−1.39, −0.04)
−0.47
(−1.25, 0.31)
2.10
(−1.24, 5.44)
−0.30
(−0.99, 0.39)
0.29
(−0.87, 1.44)
−0.37
(−1.04, 0.29)

Imposition
0.94∗∗
(0.02, 1.87)
−1.26∗∗
(−2.41, −0.10)
247
−120.10

Threat
US sender
Observations
Log Likelihood

∗∗∗

−0.73∗∗
(−1.45, −0.01)
−0.22
(−1.06, 0.62)
−1.66
(−6.36, 3.03)
0.25
(−0.47, 0.96)
1.24
(−0.73, 3.20)

−0.44
(−1.20, 0.31)
0.56
(−0.32, 1.44)
−0.97∗
(−2.02, 0.08)
200
−100.10

Significant at the 1 percent level.
Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗
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Model (2): total acquiescence to sanctions threat

Model (4): total acquiescence to imposed sanctions

Pr(Acquiescence−imposition)

Pr(Acquiescence−threat)

50%

25%

12%

0

50%

25%

12%

1

0

1

Third−party rival presence

Third−party rival presence
U.S. sender

Non−U.S. sender

Figure 3.1: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals from Models 2 and 4 in Table
3.1.
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Figure 3.2: Predictions and 95% confidence intervals from Models 1-6 in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.2: Coefficient and 95 percent confidence bounds examining target acquiescence following sanction episode (excluding sanctions involving environmental and
economic issues)
Complete Acquiescence
Sanctions threats (Logit)
(1)
Third-party rival CINC

(2)

−5.77∗∗
(−10.52, −1.01)
−0.92∗∗
(−1.77, −0.07)

Credibility
Sender-rivals
Third-party ally presence
Trade/target GDP
Democracy
Institutional sanction
Imposition
US sender
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood

(3)

−0.60
(−1.37, 0.17)
1.62
(−1.67, 4.91)
−0.18
(−0.85, 0.50)
0.37
(−0.80, 1.54)
−0.42
(−1.08, 0.24)
0.84∗
(−0.09, 1.77)
−1.14∗∗
(−2.26, −0.02)
247
−118.41

−0.47
(−1.25, 0.31)
2.20
(−1.16, 5.56)
−0.29
(−0.98, 0.39)
0.29
(−0.86, 1.45)
−0.38
(−1.04, 0.28)
0.95∗∗
(0.02, 1.87)
−1.28∗∗
(−2.43, −0.13)
247
−120.01
∗∗∗

−1.33∗∗
(−2.65, −0.01)
−0.48
(−1.26, 0.29)
1.87
(−1.43, 5.16)
−0.30
(−0.98, 0.38)
0.37
(−0.79, 1.52)
−0.34
(−0.99, 0.32)
0.88∗
(−0.04, 1.81)
−1.26∗∗
(−2.39, −0.12)
247
−120.23

Significant at the 1 percent level.
Significant at the 5 percent level.
∗
Significant at the 10 percent level.
∗∗
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Chapter 4
Micro-dynamics of Sanctions Success: Trade Openness, Institutions,
and Sanctions Success
A large body of scholarship and policy analysis has explored the circumstances under
which economic sanctions might achieve their intended policy objectives. Among
these factors (discussed in Chapter 3), sanctions appear to be more effective when
they inflict major economic harm on the supporters of the objectionable policy in
the target state (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988; Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Morgan
and Schwebach 1997; Drury 1998; Kaempfer et al. 2004; Hufbauer et al. 2007), and
when sanctions are imposed on democracies (Brooks 2002; Kaempfer et al. 2004; Allen
2005; 2008b; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Major 2012; Peksen 2019). The first strand of
sanctions literature emphasizes the impact of economic costs of sanctions on sanctions
success. The second line of research studies the possible connection between the
target’s political regime (and institutional characteristics) and sanctions success (i.e.,
micro-dynamics of sanctions introduced by the public choice approach (Kaempfer and
Lowenberg 1988)). The findings from existing literature also reveal that sanctions, as
well as their consequences (i.e., economic and financial consequences, currency crises,
and the surge of informal economies), disproportionately affect competitive sectors
and different interest groups of the target state (Kirshner 1997; Peksen and Son 2015;
Pond 2017; Peksen 2019; Early and Peksen 2019; 2020). It then raises a puzzle in
the sanctions literature: do less democratic countries (autocracies in the extreme)
unconditionally immune from sanctions by taking advantage of their small size of
ruling coalitions and the flexibility to use various repressive tactics to endure the
costs of the coercion no matter to whom (of either the incumbent government or the
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public) the target government is responsive and representative in sanctions episodes,
compared to democracies? This chapter proposes a general theoretical explanation for
sanctions success, arguing that the target’s trade openness and institutional structure
have an interactive relationship with target acquiescence.
Instead of examining the impact of trade ties and target political regimes on sanctions outcomes (i.e., target acquiescence discussed in this chapter) separately, I view
sanctions as exogenous constraints on the target’s exposure to foreign markets and
the detriment of trade activities (due to sanctions) disproportionately affect the incumbent coalition and its opponents in different political regimes. As a result, the
effects of trade ties (specifically trade openness) on sanctions outcomes are conditional
on domestic institutions that determine the winners and losers in sanctions episodes
and affect the flexibility and capability of the government to take actions following
sanctions.1 I argue that the positive relationship between trade openness and the
likelihood of target acquiescence is less prevalent in more democratic regimes because
(1) democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages when the trade is harmed
since democracy can result in changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that favor the welfare gain on average compared to non-democracies (Acemoglu
et al. 2015); (2) less democratic regimes (for example, autocracies) are more sensitive
to economic interruptions due to their less stability, greater clarity of responsibility.
This is because the dominant party or the ruling coalition control over policymaking
and hold longer terms of governance in autocracies. Additionally, less democratic
regimes are more disproportionately influenced by sanctions (i.e., the ruling coalition
is more disproportionately harmed because it is the biggest beneficiary in trade, if
not the only one) compared to democracies when trade openness is high. Finally, it
is difficult for the target’s government to adjust her current policies of the sender’s
1

The other way round, the effects of domestic institutions on sanctions outcomes are
conditional on trade openness (i.e., trade-open country vs. trade-close country) of
the target state.
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political interests to defy sanctions when the political leaders are subject to strong
institutional constraints, especially when many beneficiaries dilute the harm of the
economic sanctions in trade-open countries. Therefore, my main theoretical expectation is that democratic countries are less likely to acquiesce in sanctions when they
have more open trade because the interruption of trade activities harms the incumbent government and the broader constituents (and the opponents of the incumbent
government) more proportionately. Conversely, authoritarian (and less democratic)
countries with more open trade are more likely to acquiesce in sanctions because
sanctions harm the incumbent coalition and the opposition more disproportionately.
To assess the empirical merits of the theoretical claims, I combine data on economic sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset (Morgan et al. 2009) with the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project data
(Coppedge et al. 2020) and with the trade data from both Barbieri et al. (2008)
and UN Comtrade Database. Results support my argument that there is a significant crossover interaction effect between trade openness and electoral institutions on
sanctions outcomes.
In addition to complementing sanctions literature, this study is also relevant to
the scholarship on the possible impact of sanctions on political survival. Hankla
and Kuthy (2013) find that more institutionalized authoritarian regimes will tend
to adopt more open trade policies. Escriba-Folch and Wright (2010; 2015) conclude
that sanctions are likely to speed up the removal of leaders in personalist dictatorships
while having no discernible effect on the stability of other authoritarian governments.
Moving beyond the sole focus on the question of leadership stability (Escriba-Folch
and Wright 2010; 2015; Grauvogel et al. 2017), this study expands this line of research
assessing the economic condition on which domestic institutional dynamics of target
political regimes might affect the success rate of sanctions.
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The remainder of this chapter unfolds in four sections below. The first section
reviews sanctions literature with the focal points on the micro-foundations of sanctions success and the effect of the target’s institutional characteristics. The second
section discusses the theoretical claims explaining how the influence of trade openness
on sanctions outcomes is conditional on structural institutions (such as the domestic electoral institutions, the legislative constraints, the judicial constraints, and the
party system). The third section introduces the data, variables, and methodological
approach. The final section reports the results, followed by a discussion of implications for future research and policy-making.
4.1

Economic Foundations, Domestic Institutions, and Sanctions
Success

Yet, most studies find that the degree of the target’s economic dependence on its
sender(s) has no significant impact on its decision to resist or acquiesce in sanctions
(Dashti-Gibson et al. 1997; Drury 1998; Whang 2010; Bapat et al. 2013; Jeong and
Peksen 2019). Scholars explain the lack of strong support for the dependence argument by noting that targets might survive pressure from their economic partners
through developing new trade and investment ties with third-party countries (Early
2009; Lektzian and Biglaiser 2013; Early 2015; Peksen and Peterson 2016; Peterson
2020). Targets also use black markets and other transnational illicit channels to gain
access to scarce goods and products or sell their products to evade the costs associated with sanctions (Andreas 2005; Early and Peksen 2018). Some targets might also
receive economic assistance from their allies that would help them bear the costs of
sanctions pressure (Hufbauer et al. 2007). Overall, there is robust evidence in the literature that the strength of the targets’ economic ties with non-sanctioning countries
and their ability to access scarce goods through illicit channels significantly condition
whether sanctions will exact the intended costs on the targets to elicit behavioral
change.
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According to another body of work on the connection between target regime types
and sanctions outcomes, autocratic leaders are more inclined to resist as they often
escape the intended costs of economic coercion. They evade sanctions by intervening
in the economy to divert existing wealth and resources made scarce by sanctions
towards their supporters and away from their rivals and average citizens. Democratic
leaders, on the other hand, are more restricted in their ability to endure the costs of the
coercion through the selective delivery of goods and resources. Since their coalition
of support includes a broader mass base and popularity, it is harder for democratic
regimes to offer positive inducements to retain their constituents’ loyalty compared
to non-democratic regimes. Further, because of the strict rule of law traditions and
functioning checks and balances systems, democratic governments are also unlikely
to quell growing opposition instigated by the economic suffering through repression.
Therefore, democracies have more incentives to acquiesce in order to remain in office.
Studies also show that sanctions can also be effective against personalist regimes
because of their lack of strong political capability and developed institutions, while
single-party and military regimes, on the other hand, are unlikely to capitulate to the
sender’s demands (Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010; 2015; Peksen 2019).
One major shortcoming of the relevant research on sanctions focusing on economic ties and political regimes is that this strand of the literature assumes that
trade ties and political regimes influence sanctions outcomes independently without
distinguishing the winners and losers in sanctions episodes. The basic premise made
in these works of literature is that the ruling coalition in autocratic regimes always
have the motivations to suffer sanctions and do better in escaping the intended costs
of the coercion to their support base compared to democratic leaders, no matter how
much damage sanctions could cause on the target’s economy and what certain groups
within the target are more harmed. Notably, the focus on the target state as the
unique player acting in sanctions episodes fails to capture the micro-foundations of
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sanctions success. Unfortunately, only a few works have pointed out that economic
factors of sanctions success disproportionately affect groups in the targeted country
(Lektzian and Patterson 2015; Early and Peksen 2020). Early and Peksen (2020) argue that shadow economies hamper democratic targets’ ability to resist sanctions by
creating budgetary resource demands and deficits, and therefore leaders in democratic
countries are more likely to concede to sanctions compared to autocracies. Similarly,
Lektzian and Patterson (2015) find empirical evidence that sanctions are more successful when sanctions can hurt the group with political power relative to potential
challengers. However, it is still unclear which factors cause the disproportionate distribution of the costs associated with sanctions in the target state.
Building from the studies discussed above, I demonstrate the interactive effect between the target’s trade openness and the target’s institutional structure on sanctions
effectiveness. Figure 4.1 shows the numbers of sanctions onset grouped by the target’s
political regime types based on the data used in my analysis and the distribution of
trade openness for autocratic regimes and democratic regimes separately. According
to the figure, during the timespan of my analysis (1962-2005), 369 sanctions episodes
are targeted democratic regimes, and 157 are targeted autocratic regimes (including
military, personalist, and single-party regimes). Somehow surprisingly, according to
the box-plot of trade openness distribution across different regime types, it shows
that autocratic targets have higher trade openness compared to democratic targets
on average. The fact deviates from our intuition that democracies adopt more open
trade policies, which support the democracy-led liberal trade regime. It is probably
because the authoritarian leaders are more responsive to trading interests and are
more likely to adopt open trade policies to maximize their interests since she is one,
compared to democratic leaders. Therefore, sanctions should have a more negative
impact on the non-democratic targets whose economies heavily rely on international
trade (Peksen and Son 2015; Pond 2017; Hatipoglu and Peksen 2018; Early and
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Peksen 2019; Jeong 2020b;a). This fact creates an emerging puzzle in sanctions literature: how political leaders in power in autocratic regimes more successfully avoid
the harm of trade interruptions than leaders in democratic countries do, given that
authoritarian targets’ economies more heavily rely on international trade, although
implementing repression is possible but costly. It becomes essential to distinguish
between winners and losers in sanctions episodes in different political regimes and
their capabilities to make prompt policy changes, with different trade openness levels
to understand target resistance and acquiescence in sanctions better.
Building upon the extant literature on economic sanctions and political institutions, the primary purpose of this chapter is to assess the possible crossover interaction
effect between trade openness and domestic institutions on sanctions outcomes. Thus,
this study offers a more complex and nuanced examination of the connection between
economic factors, political institutions, and sanctions effectiveness.
4.2

Theoretical Model: Trade Openness, Public Choice, and Target
Acquiescence

Sanctions-induced economic disruptions and hardships have a wide range of adverse
economic impacts on target economies. A volume of sanctions literature has explored
the extent to which economic coercion affects the economic performance of the targets’
economies. These studies examine the performance indicators of economic growth, inflation, unemployment, foreign direct investment, global investment, private property
and wealth, financial and monetary crises, and stock markets (Hufbauer et al. 2007;
Biglaiser and Lektzian 2011; Dizaji and van Bergeijk 2013; Lektzian and Biglaiser
2013; Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2015; Peksen and Son 2015; Peksen 2017; Hatipoglu
and Peksen 2018; Biglaiser and Lektzian 2020). Intuitively, sanctions negatively impact targets’ economies when the targets’ economies heavily rely on international
trade. From the liberal perspective, targets are expected to secure their long-term
sustainability of economic growth and the consistency of open trade policies in sanc-
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tions episodes, especially when these countries are trade-open countries and therefore
are very likely to make concessions to sender demands in order to resume trade. However, sanctions are known to have a disproportionate economic impact on citizens of
the targeted country rather than the leadership (Drury and Li 2006; Lopez and Cortright 1997) and the economic costs associated with sanctions that disrupt interstate
commerce are likely to be felt disproportionately across groups in the targeted country
(Lektzian and Patterson 2015). Hence, domestic institutional structures might significantly alter the potential positive relationship between trade openness and target
acquiescence, affecting sanctions effectiveness.
Similar to the work by Escriba-Folch and Wright (2010; 2015) on sanctions and
the longevity of autocracies, I begin with the fundamental premise that target regimes
will remain defiant against sanctions to the extent that they can withstand the possible economic and political burdens of the coercion. Extending from Peksen (2019)’s
theory that the decision to defy foreign pressure partially depends on a target regime’s
ability (1) to provide positive inducements to its support coalition, and (2) to use repression to quell dissent, I theorize that such a defiant capability and motivation are
conditional on the target country’s trade openness and institutional structure. In general, material incentives and political repression are two possible instruments that the
target might employ to maintain the domestic stability when sanctions episodes harm
the supporters’ economic interests, (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003)
or when sanctions episodes raise the level of public criticism, protests, and demonstrations against the government (Allen 2008a). However, trade openness might significantly affect the motivation and feasibility of different regimes to employ these
two instruments, thereby affecting the target’s resistance to sanctions.
Autocracies care trade. Chang and Wu (2016) find empirical evidence that autocracies prefer to sign trade agreements because PTAs help dictators reduce economic
inequality by enriching poor laborers and thereby attenuate the threat of regime col-
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lapse. Additionally, more stable autocratic regimes will have longer time horizons and,
therefore, more generous incentives to adopt open trade policies (Hankla and Kuthy
2013). The informational theory of autocracy holds that dictators survive by convincing the public, primarily through adopting open trade policies in modernization
behind recent global political trends demonstrating their competency, rather than
employing force or ideology (Guriev and Treisman 2019; 2020b). If citizens conclude
that the leader is incompetent, they overthrow him. Since citizens do not directly
observe the leader’s type in less democratic regimes, the informative effect increases
when the target countries have a higher level of trade openness because manipulating
information is more difficult when the trade is terribly interrupted by sanctions. To
conclude, autocracies are more sensitive to economic interruptions for several reasons
compared to democratic countries. First, trade matters in autocracies while greater
repression actually predicts lower approval (Guriev and Treisman 2020a). Therefore,
it is essential for the ruling party in autocracies to secure victories through direct
economic appeals from the continuous and stable accumulation of trade gains and
to secure the regime’s ability to distribute rents and prevent their “loyal friends”
forming subversive coalitions both by members of the ruling elite and by outside rivals (Magaloni 2008). Second, voters penalize incumbents when economic volatility
increases. Democracies, compared to autocracies, are characterized by less volatility in economic growth rates. Democratic stability does not appear to arise because
democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages (Quinn 2001). Therefore, the
relationship between economic performance and votes should be less pronounced in
more democratic regimes. Third, economic performance has a more significant impact on voting where clarity of responsibility was greater (Powell and Whitten 1993).
According to Powell and Whitten (1993), “true minority governments...are less likely
to lose votes in elections than are their majoritarian counterparts, and voters seem
less likely to penalize incumbent governments that are made up of multiple parties”
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(pg.410). Therefore, incumbents in less democratic regimes should be more sensitive
to trade interruptions because fewer institutional actors are responsible for economic
growth. Furthermore, ruling coalitions in autocracies have a greater opportunity
to receive credit or blame for the effect of policies given the absence of term limits
and thus should be more responsive to sanctions compared to incumbents in more
democratic regimes. According to the above discussion, I argue that democracies
and non-democracies are comparable in their sensitivity and responsiveness to trade
openness, looking into the different electoral institutions of the different regimes when
trade openness is high.
For the first instrument that the target might employ to maintain the domestic stability, to protect its supporters in autocratic regimes and the constituency in
democracies from adverse economic effects of sanctions, target leaders might supply
a range of material incentives to maintain their supporters or constituency’s welfare
gain. This, in turn, maintains their cooperation levels from their support base and
thus enhances leadership stability (Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003;
Escriba-Folch and Wright 2010; 2015). In political regimes with small ruling coalitions in less democratic countries, leaders tend to selectively distribute rewards and
perks, such as targeted tax breaks and transfers and scarce goods access. As the
support base’s size increases in more democratic countries, the regime would be more
inclined to provide public goods and services to all citizens or a large segment of the
citizenry. The implicit assumption behind the rationale in sanctions literature is that
sanctions always precisely hurt the supporters’ interest. Compared to authoritarian
regimes, leaders in democracies are more attentive to the public’s welfare in general
(Allen 2005; Lektzian and Souva 2007; Allen 2008b). However, this fact also undermines their capabilities to retain power by not adversely affecting the well-being of
the electorate in resistance if sanctioned. As a result, democratic governments are
more likely to make concessions to foreign pressure because the larger size of their
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support base (compared to autocracies) restricts their ability to offer positive inducements to minimize defections from their support coalition (Peksen 2019). The above
reasoning follows that authoritarian regimes are more resistant to sanctions, given
that nondemocratic governments can redistribute goods and resources to offset the
economic loss for a smaller size of supporters with few structural constraints.
Political repression is another strategy the sanctioned regimes might pursue to
maintain the status quo. The poverty, unemployment, and other adverse economic
conditions caused by sanctions are important sources of economic grievances and
dissatisfaction against the government, especially among economically marginalized
groups (Allen 2008a; Weiss 1999). Earlier research finds evidence that target leaders
employ a range of repressive tactics such as torture, political imprisonment, media
censorship, and the curtailment of political pluralism and participation in response
to dissent and opposition (Wood 2008; Peksen 2009; Peksen and Drury 2010). In this
sense, the use of repressive tools subsequently helps the regime avert their authority’s
erosion. Peksen (2019) contends that democratic governments are more constrained
by various institutional mechanisms such as the strong systems of checks and balances
and removal of the government through the popular vote (McCormick and Mitchell
1997; Davenport 1999; Poe et al. 1999), and thus are more likely to defer to the
demands of sender countries to cease the economic suffering and eventually remain
in power.
However, these two possible instruments that the target might employ to maintain
the domestic stability only explain the non-democratic target’s resistance to sanctions
episodes in the ideal cases that sanctions proportionately harm the ruling coalition
and its opponents in the target country and the target’s economy does not heavily
rely on trade. In fact, this is not always the case (Lektzian and Patterson 2015; Early
and Peksen 2020). Autocracies might be more vulnerable to trade interruptions when
they have relatively higher trade openness compared to democracies from the per-
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spective of political leaders in power. It is because the political leaders in autocracies
are the major beneficiaries. Otherwise, trade would not be open. Further, if sanctions
enhance the political effectiveness of the opposition groups within the target, then
the prices of both repression and loyalty will increase. Therefore, relatively speaking,
target leaders are more likely to acquiesce since sanctions favor their domestic adversaries because the ruling coalition in authoritarian regimes is the largest beneficiary
in trade. In contrast, consistent with the public choice literature, if the sanctions
harm the target country’s economy to such an extent as to impoverish the public, the
domestic opposition’s ability to exert influence might be weakened (Kaempfer et al.
2004). This counterproductive effect of sanctions is expected to be more pronounced
in more democratic countries since trade is proportionately beneficial for the ruling
coalition and the public in democratic countries compared to the welfare distribution
in autocracies. Hence, in more democratic countries, the ruling party and the constituents are more proportionately harmed. Therefore, democratic countries should
be less responsive to trade interruptions than autocracies when trade openness is
high. The ruling coalition is disproportionately more harmed (because she is the one
who benefits more from trade).
Similarly, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988)’s public choice approach holds that
sanctions work better if they weaken those interest groups’ economic and political
power that support the objectional policy rather than harming the opposition’s wellbeing and the target society as a whole. Sanctions can weaken the incumbent regime
and strengthen its opponents and provide them with the opportunities to exercise
their newfound strength in autocratic (or less democratic) countries. This is because
trade is disproportionately beneficial for the ruling coalition and its opponents due
to the nature of the autocratic institutional structure, which favors the ruling coalition and suppresses the opposition. When trade-open target states are autocracies,
sanctions harm the incumbent ruling coalition more than they do to the opposition
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because incumbents benefit more from trade than the public as well as their opponents before the trade is interrupted. Relatively speaking, the opposition is less
weakened in autocracies in sanctions. Suppose sanctions disproportionately harm the
incumbent coalition, either through a relative decline in available resources or through
increasing the regime’s costs of implementing repression and patronage. In this case,
the sanctioner could create a situation where their objectives are more likely to be
achieved. Moreover, the regime’s capability to repress dissent might increase if an
indigent populace is more readily policed in more democratic countries. Therefore, a
trade-open autocracy is more likely to acquiesce, while a trade-closed democracy is
less likely to acquiesce when trade openness is high.
Additionally, democracy reduces income inequality (Reuveny and Li 2003). Democracies are likely to implement policies that reduce wealth inequality simply because
democracy redistributes political power in favor of the majority and therefore has
more votes than the wealthy and thus involves equalizing policies (Lenski 1966; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000; 2006; Boix 2003). Although these arguments have been
challenged on multiple fronts (Scheve and Stasavage 2017), the bottom line is that
democracy can result in changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that
favor the welfare gain on average compared to non-democracies (Acemoglu et al.
2015).2 Therefore, democracies ameliorate the effects of social cleavages when the
trade is harmed since democracy can result in changes in fiscal redistribution and economic structure that favor the welfare gain on average compared to non-democracies
(Acemoglu et al. 2015), while less democratic countries fail to accomplish this as effectively as more democratic countries and thus are less defiant following sanctions
2

See Haggard and Kaufman (2012) and Ansell and Samuels (2014) on regime change
as well as Acemoglu et al. (2015) on whether democracy leads to lower inequality.
Boix (2015) provides a further important discussion of the relationship between
democracy and inequality.
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episodes, especially when trade openness is high. In line with the discussion above, I
advance the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 7. When trade openness is high, the target is more likely to resist sanctions
as the extent to which the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense
achieved increases.
Hypothesis 8. Within countries that adopt open trade policies, authoritarian regimes
are more likely to acquiesce in sanctions compared to democratic
regimes.
4.3

Data and Methods

To test my hypothesis developed in the previous section, I conduct a large N empirical
analysis using the sanctions cases initiated between 1962 and 2005 documented by
TIES data set (Morgan et al. 2014). This time frame is delimited on the left by the
availability of data used to calculate trade openness and the right by the availability
of sanctions data. The unit of analysis is the sanctions case. My dependent variable is
target acquiescence, a dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the target gives in to sender
demands and equal to 0 otherwise. The TIES data distinguish between complete and
partial acquiescence; accordingly, I specify multiple versions of this variable. First, I
code target acquiescence only if TIES reports total acquiescence by the target, i.e., it
is coded one if the targeted state acquiesces to all of the sender’s demands following
the sanctions episode, and zero otherwise. Second, I create a broader measure of
acquiescence that includes total or partial acquiescence equal to 1, otherwise zero.
In the supplemental appendix, I code an ordinal version of the dependent variable
with three categories (from lowest to highest acquiescence): no target acquiescence
(=0), partial acquiescence (=1), and total acquiescence (=2). The results remain
consistent. I code dependent variables for the year t, while all other variables are
coded for the year t − 1, to preclude feedback bias. Since the outcome variable target
acquiescence is dichotomous, I estimate logistic models to test my hypothesis. In this
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test period covered by TIES, the final outcome variable is not coded in TIES for 367
cases either because cases are still ongoing or the data are missing. I consider these
ongoing cases with the outcome of the target’s resistance since the target has not
acquiesced as the date reported.3
4.3.1

Independent Variables: Trade Openness and Institutional
Characteristics

Trade Openness
To determine whether different regimes with different institutional characteristics
view trade differently and to determine whether the ruling coalition and the electorate benefit from trade proportionately and thus respond to sanctions divergently,
I first measure the level of trade openness at the start of sanctions. Trade openness
is commonly measured as the natural log of the target’s total trade flows (exports
and imports) as a percentage of its GDP (Russett and Oneal 2001). I follow this
operationalization and use the UN Comtrade data (ranging from 1962 to 2005) to
code this variable. A higher value of trade openness indicates more open trade and
that the target’s economy (measured by GDP) relies more on international trade.

Electoral Democracy Index
I then adopt the Electoral Democracy Index variable from the V-Dem data set to
distinguish different institutional characteristics of different regime types with a focal
point on the electoral institution.4 It helps me better approximate how dispropor3

The results are consistent when I drop these sanctions episodes from the analysis.

4

There are many dimensions to democracy. For example, the measurement of veto
players (Jeong and Peksen 2019) focuses on institutional constraints. The measurement of political cleavages (i.e., abundant factor vs. scarce factor) (Lektzian and
Patterson 2015) emphasizes political segments. Polity score (Marshall and Jaggers
2014) is commonly used while failing to capture structural democracy. I focus on
the government’s representativeness and responsiveness to the public, using the EDI
variable.
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tionately the ruling coalition and the public (as well as the incumbent government’s
opponents) benefit from trade to look into the target country’s electoral institutions.
The index of electoral democracy is formed by taking the weighted average of the indices measuring freedom of association thick, clean elections, freedom of expression,
elected officials, and suffrage (V-Dem Codebook).5 Therefore, it is more prevalent
that trade is the welfare gain on average in the target state with a higher EDI score.
The Electoral Democracy Index variable ranges between 0 to 1. A higher electoral
democracy score thus represents a more representative and responsible government.
In these countries with a higher EDI score, open trade benefits more proportionately
for both the incumbents and the public (including the incumbents’ opponents). In
contrast, autocracies receive a lower EDI score, and the incumbents receive more
benefits from trade than the public and especially their opponents.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the association between the electoral democracy index variable and the trade openness variable. The graph includes all target states between
1962 and 2005. Different colors indicate different years in which these countries are
documented. According to the graph, Singapore has the highest trade openness and
a relatively low EDI score. Saudi Arabia has the lowest EDI score, while its economy moderately relies on trade. Some most democratic countries (with a high EDI
score), for instance, Belgium and Switzerland, have very high trade openness, while
democratic countries like Norway and India have relatively low trade openness. Overall, there is a relatively large variation of the distribution of trade openness across
different regimes. Again, this distribution verifies the necessity to examine the possi5

The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers
responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate’s
approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society
organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or
systematic irregularities, and elections affect the composition of the chief executive
of the country.
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ble interaction effect between trade openness and domestic institutions on sanctions
outcomes.

Democracy
As an alternative, I identify democratic targets with a dichotomous variable coded
one if a target’s 21-point combined Polity score is greater than six, otherwise zero
(Marshall and Jaggers 2014). The Polity Score is computed by subtracting the AUTOC 6 score from the DEMOC 7 score, ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to
−10 (strongly autocratic). The purpose of adopting Democracy variable as an alternative is to make my study and results comparable to existing works, given that prior
focus on regime types tended to be narrowly limited to using Polity scores.

Regime Types
I also apply different approaches to categorizing regime types. First, among democracies, I distinguish proportional representation (PR) from majoritarian (SMDP) electoral systems and identify authoritarian regimes (specifically including closed autocracies and electoral autocracies) using data from V-Dem version 8 (Coppedge et al.
2020). In the alternate model, I omit the trichotomous regime type/electoral system
variable in favor of a more nuanced categorization of the authoritarian regime.8 . The
data for the political regimes come from Geddes et al. (2014). The regime type vari6

It is aggregated by the values of indicators of Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Regulation of Participation, and Openness of Executive Recruitment,
Constraint on Chief Executive, and Competitiveness of Political Participation.

7

It is aggregated by the values of indicators of Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Constraint on Chief Executive, and
Competitiveness of Political Participation.

8

The classification of the autocratic political regimes is based on whether policy decision, leadership selection, or the security apparatus is under the control of the
military institution (Military), a royal family, or a small group centered around an
individual autocrat (Personal), or a dominant party (Single Party).
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able controls for four binary variables: Democracy, Military, Personal, and Single
Party. These variables are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The reference group is
democracy. At last, with a focus on democracies, I adopt the measure of institutionalized popular inclusion from Joshi et al. (2019). This IRT-estimated variable, which
the authors call the Institutional Democracy Index (IDI), captures an ensemble of
indicators capturing participation (universal suffrage, automatic voter registration,
and compulsory voting), limits on elite veto players (unicameralism), and a more
fine-grained indicator of the electoral system.

Institutional Features
The last set of explanatory variables measure the institutional features that could constrain the target’s capability and flexibility to make policy changes in accordance with
the sender’s demands. These variables include legislative constraints on the executive
index, judicial constraints on the executive index, and party institutionalization index.
These variables range from zero to one. A higher value indicates more constraints on
the executive power. For the party institutionalization index variable, a higher score
on these attributes generally indicates a more institutionalized party system.
4.3.2

Additional Control Variables

I control for a set of control variables to account for the major covariates of sanctions
success. First of all, I control for the presence of the target’s third-party rival, given
the findings in chapter 3. Next, I control for the presence of the target’s third-party
ally. The target is less vulnerable to sanctions when its allies are wealthy if any, and
thus are expected to be more defiant following sanctions (Peksen and Peterson 2016).
The third-party ally variable captures the possibility that the target’s allies (if any)
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defend the target during sanctions. The COW Formal Alliance (v.4.1) data (Gibler
2009) is used to capture third-party commitments to defend the target.9
To measure economic ties between the sender state and the target country, I
adopt the target trade dependence measurement, which is calculated by dividing the
target’s total trade (exports and imports) with the sender by the target’s GDP. It
assesses the extent of a target state’s reliance on trade with the sender. Target
countries economically dependent on the sender might be more inclined to give in to
the external pressure. The trade data are from Barbieri et al. (2009).
I also include the institutional sanction variable to account for the expectation that
sanctions under the auspices of international institutions are more effective in achieving their intended policy objectives (Doxey 1987; Martin 1993; Bapat and Morgan
2009). It is a binary measure coded one if an international institution is a sender and
zero otherwise. Sanctions led by international institutions might be more successful
as multiple states exert pressure and thus limit the availability of alternative markets
and third-party states for the target to redirect its trade and financial relations.
I also account for sanctions imposition. The imposition variable is coded one if a
sanction is eventually imposed, otherwise zero.
Earlier research finds a significant association between the issue under dispute
and sanctions success (Lindsay 1986; Ang and Peksen 2007). Sender states might be
more motivated to see economic coercion success in disputes involving major political
issues. I add the trade issue variable to my models to control for this assumption.
Specifically, I code a binary variable equal to one when sanctions episodes solely
9

Available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/formal-alliances. The network method allows going beyond the dyadic approach and capturing greater variation in international relations. See Cranmer et al. (2014) and Cranmer and Desmarais (2016) for examples. However, since it is unclear how third-party allies might
collaborate to defend the target state, I only adopt the dichotomous measure for the
dyadic alliance relationship between the target and its third-party allies to capture
the possibility of support during sanctions.
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involve trade or environmental issues, otherwise zero. Finally, I identify the United
States as a sender, given its unique status as a global hegemon that uses sanctions
often. The detailed summary statistics of all my variables used in my models are
presented in Appendix tables.
4.4

Analysis

The results of my statistical analysis show strong support for my hypothesis. Specifically, I find evidence that the potential target’s trade openness influences the likelihood that the target acquiesces following sanctions threat in specifically authoritarian
regimes.10 However, as the target regime becomes more democratic (i.e., as the EDI
increases), this association diminishes in magnitude and loses statistical significance.
Table 4.1 presents the results of six logit models examining target complete acquiescence. Models 1 and 2 use electoral democracy index and polity score to measure
the target’s democracy respectively. Models 3, 4, and 5 examine the impact of different institutional features on the target’s acquiescence following sanctions. Looking
within democracies, in Model 5, the refined alternative measurement of democracy
is the institutional democracy index. Examining the target’s complete acquiescence,
I find that the trade openness coefficient is positive and significant in models 1, 3, 4,
and 5. In Model 1, because the variable interacts with EDI, the coefficient indicates
only the impact of an increasing trade openness when the EDI score is equal to 0.
Ideally, for the least representative and responsible governments, trade openness is
positively associated with target acquiescence. This finding is consistent with my
theoretical claims and the existing literature that the authoritarian target is more
likely to acquiesce when its economy heavily relies on international trade because she
is the one to whom she is responsive.
10

A EDI score of zero represents the least representative and responsible government,
although such an EDI score of zero does not exist.
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From Model 1, examining the probability of target complete acquiescence, when
EDI equals zero and holding the target characteristics of no third-party rival and no
ally presence, with a median trade dependence on the sender of 0.031, and holding the
sanctions episode features of the lack of international institution’s support, sanctions
threat on non-economic and non-environmental issues by a non-US sender, I find
that an increase from zero trade openness to its median of 0.241 is associated with
an increase in the probability of the target’s acquiescence from 0.20 to 0.36, with a
77.51% increase.
The coefficient for EDI is also positive and significant in Model 1, given that trade
openness equals zero. This seemingly violates the conventional wisdom that democracies are more likely to acquiesce to sanctions episodes. However, the coefficient for
solely EDI is meaningless in reality, given that no one would actually care for sanctions if a country does not trade with other countries at all. The interaction term
is negative and significant in Model 1. Although this result could suggest that the
marginal effect of trade openness decreases as EDI increases, interaction terms offer
little explanatory power in nonlinear models (Norton et al. 2004). Accordingly, I turn
to Figure 4.3 to illustrate my conditional marginal effects.
In the upper-left plot of 4.3, the solid line indicates the probability of the target’s
complete acquiescence for states with low (10th percentile) EDI (i.e., less democratic
regimes) over the range spanning the 10th to 90th percentile of trade openness. The
dashed line indicates the probability of the target’s total acquiescence for states with
high (90th percentile) values of EDI (i.e., more democratic regimes) over the same
range of trade openness. Shaded 95% confidence bounds accompany both lines. The
upper-right plot complements these predictions with an illustration of the marginal
effect of trade openness conditional on the value of EDI. The upper-left plot shows
that when the target government’s representativeness and responsiveness are low (i.e.,
when EDI is held at its 10th percentile), an increase in target trade openness from its
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10th to 90th percentile is associated with an increase in the probability of acquiescence,
from roughly 0.1 to 0.25. However, when the target has a high value of EDI (i.e.,
when EDI is held at its 90th percentile), an increase in target trade openness from its
10th to 90th percentile is associated with a decrease in the probability of acquiescence,
from roughly 0.26 to 0.05. The top-right graph shows the same pattern: at lower
levels of target EDI, trade openness has a positive and significant marginal effect on
the probability of target acquiescence. However, this marginal effect diminishes and
turns to be negative as target EDI increases. These findings provide support for my
hypothesis.
The middle two plots in Figure 4.3 illustrate the “other side” of the interaction
(Berry et al. 2012). Specifically, the middle-left plot illustrates the probability of target acquiescence for the 10th (solid line) to 90th (dashed line) percentile of the value of
trade openness, over the range of low (10th percentile) to high (90th percentile) values
of target EDI on the x-axis. The middle-right plot illustrates the conditional marginal
effect of target EDI over the same range of target trade openness. As expected, these
plots show that the EDI’s effect on target acquiescence is less pronounced (i.e., democracies are less likely to acquiesce) when target trade openness increases. Thus, again,
these results support my hypothesis.
Models 3-5 in Table 4.1 show that the interaction terms between trade openness
and institutional features (i.e., legislative constraints, judicial constraints, and party
institutionalization are negative and significant). These coefficients indicate that the
positive impact of trade openness on the target’s acquiescence decreases as the target
faces more institutional constraints.
Turning to tests on domestic institutions’ effect using a different measurement of
democracy, Table 4.1 presents coefficients and 95% confidence bounds for three models
examining the target’s acquiescence. Model 1 examines the impact of the three-level
regime type variable on the target’s acquiescence. Model 2 uses a four-level regime
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type variable with a more detailed categorization of the authoritarian regimes (i.e.,
military, single party, personalist, and democracy as the reference group). In model 3,
the explanatory variable simply divides regimes into democracy and non-democracy.
Results from Models 1-3 in Table 4.1 remain consistent with my hypothesis that
the positive impact of trade openness on target acquiescence is less pronounced in
democracies compared to non-democracies. As above, I use visualizations to provide
a complete explanation of probabilities and marginal effects associated with the interaction of trade openness and regime type (i.e., democracy vs. non-democracy)
displayed in Model 3.
Specifically, the bottom two plots in Figure 4.3 illustrate the interaction as estimated in Model 3 from Table 4.1. These two figures are set up like the other four
in Figure 4.3, distinct only in terms of a part of the interaction term takes dichotomous values (i.e., 0 for non-democracy vs. 1 for democracy). In the bottom-left
plot, the solid line indicates the probability of democratic target acquiescence. The
dashed line demonstrates the probability of non-democratic target acquiescence. For
democracies, trade openness is negatively associated with acquiescence. For nondemocracies, trade openness is positively associated with acquiescence. The bottomright plot shows that democracy is associated with a negative association between
trade openness and target acquiescence, while non-democracy is associated with a
positive association between trade openness and target acquiescence.
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4.5

Conclusion

Moving to the target’s domestic environment in which the target responds to sanctions, this chapter examines the interactive impact of trade openness and institutions
on the probability of sanctions success. I assert that institutional structure, conditional on trade openness, motivates and constrains the target’s leaders’ decision to
defy foreign pressure. Sanctions are more likely to succeed when they disproportionately harm the ruling coalition and the public in authoritarian regimes which
adopt open-trade policies. Sanctions are less likely to succeed when institutions blur
responsibility and ameliorate social cleavages introduced by trade interruptions in
democratic countries, although trade openness is high in these countries. Additionally, it is difficult for the target government to adjust its policies to acquiesce sanctions in accordance with the senders’ demands when the political leaders are subject
to strong institutional constraints (such as legislative constraints, judicial constraints,
and party institutionalization), especially when many beneficiaries dilute the harm of
economic coercion in trade-open countries. It follows that sender states need greater
awareness of the target’s overall economic structure and the target state’s institutional
structure if they want to induce concessions from the target effectively.
My dissertation provides several avenues for substantively and methodologically
innovative future projects. I am particularly interested in extending my dissertation
into a book with a more nuanced analysis of the international environment network in
which the target survives, further considering the relationship between the sender and
the target’s third-party rivals. Specifically, I intend to add a chapter to disentangle the
impact of a triadic relationship among the sender, the target, and the target’s thirdparty rivals (for instance, US-Pakistan-India) on sanctions use and sanctions efficacy
using network analysis and another emphasizing the impact of complex interactions
between systemic and domestic factors on sanctions propensities.
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Table 4.1: Coefficient and 95 percent confidence bounds examining target acquiescence following sanctions threat
Complete Acquiescence
Trade openness
Authoritarian
Democracy-PR

(1)

(2)

(3)

−2.05
(−4.92, 0.83)
−1.24∗∗
(−2.25, −0.22)
−0.33
(−1.73, 1.07)

−3.15∗∗∗
(−5.38, −0.92)

1.24
(−0.25, 2.73)

−1.33
(−3.47, 0.81)
−2.13∗∗∗
(−3.29, −0.96)
−3.48∗
(−7.21, 0.25)

Military
Single party
Personalist

0.86∗∗
(0.00, 1.73)

Democracy
Openness x authoritarian
Openness x democracy-PR

3.41∗∗
(0.38, 6.45)
−1.20
(−5.79, 3.39)
7.34∗
(−0.45, 15.13)
4.26∗∗∗
(1.51, 7.01)
20.31∗∗
(0.19, 40.44)

Openness x military
Openness x single party
Openness x personalist
Openness x democracy
Third-party rival
Third-party ally
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood

−0.31
(−0.80, 0.17)
−0.74∗∗
(−1.35, −0.14)
−0.03
628
−233.37
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−0.44
(−0.97, 0.09)
−1.18∗∗∗
(−1.85, −0.50)
0.46
606
−211.58

−3.48∗∗∗
(−5.88, −1.09)
−0.28
(−0.76, 0.21)
−0.58∗∗
(−1.16, −0.00)
−1.29∗∗∗
635
−243.35
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Figure 4.1: Sanctions Initiations by Target Regime Types and Distribution of Trade
Openness (1962-2005)
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